Speculation on Botswana as a regional HQ for AFRICOM in Southern Africa

Maparangwane BDF (Air Wing) Base (from Google Earth Community)
circled above in yellow, closer up below, from Google Maps
‎ Botswana Defence Force Base, approximately 75km from the capital Gaborone. The main runway is astonishingly long for its intended use at 3360 metres. This has led to speculation over it's true role. Some people say it may serve as a landing and refuelling post for US spyplanes or as an alterante landing location for the space shuttle in the southern hemisphere given it's relatively close distance to the equator.

BAUMHOLDER, Germany - Jeffrey Morrison, the U.S. Army's 21st Theater Sustainment Command director of logistics (right), explains the process of loading vehicles onto rail cars to Botswanan officers (left to right) Captain Kabo Moswenyane, Lieutenant Gaopale Swereki and Major Ompatile Modisenyane, in Baumholder, Germany, on March 5, 2008. The purpose of the visit was to help the Botswanan officers learn about rail operations and bolster relations with the U.S. military. The Botswanan officers also received briefings on the military police, the Distribution Management Center and the use of American military jargon. They also traveled to other Army and Air Force installations in the area. (U.S. Army photo by Sergeant Phillip Valentine)

It is obvious from the photo and caption above, taken from africom.mil, that Botswana enjoys a close working relationship with the US military.

Botswana's one party democracy has long been a friend of the United States. Although Botswana has publicly questioned the creation of AFRICOM there have been ongoing rumors of agreements between the US and Botswana to host an AFRICOM base. That base may already be in place in the form of the Thebephatshwa Airport/Maparangwane BDF (Air Wing) Base. It is located about halfway between Molepolole and Letlhakeng, north and east of Gaborone. It is also referred to as Molepolole.

You can see it in this photo titled: A large US military base in the middle of Botswana. Taken enroute to WDH at FL350. Photo taken in 2003 by Julian Whitelaw. Click the link above to see the photo.

And Wikipedia has an interactive map of the base, info courtesy of b real, who adds:

where i found out about it was on an AFRICOM thread at the usmc's small wars council forum & military guys there say it was indeed built by the u.s. before apartheid ended in south africa.

From discussion at Google Earth Community, bbs.keyhole.com:

The base is called Maparangwane (that might be hard for you to get your tounge around). I have been there numerous times. It was probably (these things are usually kept secret) developed with the technical support of the USAF, but in all probability was funded entirely by Botswana's Government. We aren't exactly a poor country. If you use the ruler and go 71.37 Kilometres West south west (thats in between west and southwest) fom this airbase you will see the country's largest diamond mine at Jwaneng (marked by bright blue pools of some sort) - we have three. We are the 2nd largest producer of gem quality stones after Russia.

Anyways I sa with some probablity because it is possible that the ISAF have a sharing agreement with the government and might have footed some of the bill, but the country could easily afford to design and build such a thing.

. . .
The Eagle project. French influence, not US. Fighter, transport and chopper squadrons on base as well as a training squadron with PC-7 aircraft. The fighters are former canadian CF-5 A and B Freedom Fighters, which were sold to the BDF Air Arm after having been refurbished for the original 419 Squadron of the Canadian Armed Forces at CFB Cold Lake, Alberta Canada. After 419 was shut down in the mid 90s, they were sold and delivered via AN-124 air transport to the base were they were formed into 28 Squadron BDF AA. Transports are former USAF C-130 B versions, also refurbished. Choppers are 412s. Occasionally you might see a Global Express on the field. Botswana has spend considerable funds in the last 10 years on hardware from the Netherlands, Spain, France, Germany, UK, USA and Canada as well as from SA. Chinese technology and Indian expertise is present throughout the country. For such a small country they have accumulated an impressive arsenal. Although Thebe Phatswa (which is the actual base name) is the main air force base, the HQ is actually located just outside Gaborone and mostly Army. FOLs include Francistown and Maun. The foreign military in Botswana include mostly spec ops training elements from the UK US and a variety of african nations, not always with the knowledge of the BDF. Expats still run a large portion of tech intensive hardware and conduct training on various bases and in the field.
. . .

AFB Molepolole (USAF and BDF) 04/26/06 11:54 AM (google earth community)
The Botswana Defence Force Air Wing is the air force of Botswana.The Air Wing was formed in 1977 and is organisationally part of the Botswana Defence Force.All squadrons are designated with a Z, which has no meaning but is used as a designation for 'squadron'. The main base is Molepolole and was built mostly by foreign contractors from 1992 being finished around 1996.
this is the main Air base for Botswana'a Air Force. well actually that's pretentious. The Botswana Defence Force (the Army) has an Air wing, similar to what the UK had before wwII - as there isn't much need for a peaceful country to have a full air force.

From General Mompati S. Merafhe, the Botswana minister of foreign affairs and international cooperation, in October 2003, General Merafhe vigorously denies that it is an American airbase:

Regarding the alleged American airbase, let me state for the record that the United States does not own any military base in Botswana. The airbase that is being referred to is the Thebephatshwa Airbase that is wholly owned by the government of Botswana.

The airbase was constructed during my term as commander of the Botswana Defence Force with our own resources and without any assistance from the United States or any other country for that matter.

In fact, during construction, the Americans publicly accused Botswana of excessive military spending and threatened to cut economic aid to Botswana. So, if the Americans built the airbase, how could they then accuse us of excessive military spending on the airbase?

We have done our best to demonstrate that these allegations are false. Among other things, we have used every opportunity to conduct tours of the airbase for military dignitaries visiting Botswana, including military chiefs from the region. The purpose is to demonstrate to the region and indeed the international community that there is nothing sinister or clandestine about the airbase?

I have decided to raise this matter here because my government is seriously concerned about the damage this campaign of disinformation is doing to the image of Botswana in the region and internationally. Fortunately, we take solace in the fact that mud never sticks on a clean surface, it cakes and falls away.

From Scramble in the Netherlands comes this information about the Air Wing of the Botswana Defense Force.

The Botswana Defence Force Air Wing was formed in 1977 as a result of rising tension in the area. All squadrons are designated with a .Z., which has no meaning but is just used as a designation for .squadron.. Main base is Molepolole which was built mostly by foreign contractors from 1992 and was finished round 1996. Other bases used are the International Airport at Gaborone and Francistown.

The backbone of the Air Wing is formed by ex Canadian CF-116s which are locally designated as CF-5. Thirteen ex-Canadian CF-116s (ten single-seaters and three trainers) were ordered in 1996 to replace the Strikemasters, with another three single-seaters and two double-seaters delivered in 2000. For transport the Air Wing uses BN-2A/B, C212, CN235 and C-130Bs. Latest addition to the transport-fleet was an ex-AMARC C-130B to complement the two existing aircraft.

In 2000, three additional AS350BA helicopters were bought for Z21, bringing the total to eight.. The single Italian built AB412 has been replaced by an Bell 412EP in VIP-configuration. Z21 has a total of six Bell 412s of which the Bell412EP is being used by the VIP-Flight. Flying training is done on seven PC-7s. The VIP flight uses besides the Bell412 a Gulfstream and a Be200. In 1993 nine ex US Army/AMARC O-2As were delivered for use in the battle against poaching.

So what is actually going on between the US and Botwana. Your guess is as good as mine. But keep in mind these words from General Ward's Q&A for his confirmation hearing, PDF: U.S. Africa Command Will Enhance Local Skills, Problem Solving, again, courtesy of b real:

on basing criteria
- - -
Some of the criteria includes: political stability; security factors; access to regional and intercontinental transportation; availability of acceptable infrastructure; quality of life; proximity to the African Union and regional organizations; proximity to USG hubs; adequate Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). The transition team has used these criteria to narrow down potential sites. Those potential sites have been briefed to the Dept of State informally and we have begun dialogue on the advantages and disadvantages of those sites.

Botswana meets these criteria. There was also a recent article in Air Force Times about two Air Force generals named to top spots in AFRICOM, which would fit in with air bases.

Brought up from the comments, courtesy of b real, and added April 9:

THE BOTSWANA DEFENCE FORCE: Evolution of a professional African military

. . . No discussion of politics or military affairs in Botswana can avoid a discussion of Seretse Khama Ian Khama. He is the most eminent member of what might be called the ‘first family’ of Botswana. His father, Sir Seretse Khama, was a national hero, prominent in the struggle for full national independence, and founder of the party that has governed the country since independence, serving as the country’s president from its founding in 1966 until his death in office in 1980. When the Defence Force was created in 1977, Ian Khama was appointed its deputy commander with the rank of brigadier. Twelve years later, in 1989, he acceded to the command of the BDF with the rank of lieutenant general, a post he subsequently held for nine years. Khama’s service spanned the formative period of the Defence Force’s evolution, and despite his retirement in 1998 to enter politics, he continues to have a close connection with Botswana’s military. Khama’s current positions of vice-president and party chair of the ruling party are widely believed in Botswana to guarantee his accession to the presidency when the incumbent, Festus Mogae, steps down. However, Khama’s activities over the course of his military and political career have provoked controversy and he is accused of having very authoritarian tendencies. Many among Botswana’s educated elite view a future Khama presidency with some trepidation. . . .

From the US Dept. of State:

The United States has been the largest single contributor to the development of the BDF, and a large segment of its officer corps has received U.S. training.

. . . The United States considers Botswana an advocate of and a model for stability in Africa and has been a major partner in Botswana's development since its independence.

Botswana, military ties the main issue, not tribe includes the mention that "One knowledgeable [military] source estimated in 2004 that 75 per cent of BDF officers above the rank of major are graduates of US military schools."

the wikipedia entry on BDF says that "by 1999 approximately 85% of the BDF officers are said to have been trained under this system [IMET]."

It sounds very much as though Botswana is evolving away from democracy, and into a military government. And I am sure the US Department of Defense and AFRICOM are most happy and comfortable with Botswana's movement into militarism. This provides the US with a happy and willing "partner", well placed to act as a US surrogate on the African continent. And it puts the US Department of Defense and the Botswana government in the same business, speaking the same language. The less democracy, the more it becomes a military government, the more a few "boys in the back room" can make decisions without any pesky interference from legislatures, or the public at large. This further weakens what democracy is left. So the US can help "partner" away democratic institutions in Botswana.

This is a perfect illustration of why a military command cannot help foster democratic institutions, and economic development. The structure of a military command is a strict heirarchy organized to achieve military ends that require heirarchy and line of authority. In order to have political and economic development, a country must draw from a far wider pool for input, ideas, and investment, and defer to voices across a range of roles and ranks. It would certainly be nice if the US was investing as much money training people for other forms of public service, for all the skills that go into governing and delivering public services, water, sewars, electicity, roads, schools, clinics, hospitals, from local towns and municipalities to national governments, rather than building "defense" forces. The photo op "humanitarian" projects help, but they are no substitute for serious investment in developing civilian governing skills and institutions. Unfortunately, the current US governement does not believe in investing in these at home, and does not appear to believe in the actual practice of democracy.

What will happen if and when the citizens of Botswana become unhappy with losing their democracy to a military government? What role will the US play in that case?

AFRICOM, US military bases, and Ghana

Pictures from the USS Fort McHenry, the African Partnership Station,
you will find discussion of AFRICOM, bases, and US military programs in Ghana and Africa below the photos.

TEMA, Ghana (Nov. 20, 2007) Rear Adm. Tony Kurta, director for Policy, Resources and Strategy, United States Naval Forces Europe, and Ghanaian navy Commodore Matthew Quashie, Eastern Ghana Naval Command, meet with Africa Partnership Station (APS) staff at the Tema Naval Base. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class RJ Stratchko, 071120-N-8933S-015 Released)

TAKORADI, Ghana (Feb. 8, 2008) Staff Sgt. Franklin Davis, of East Brunswick, N.J., a Marine assigned to Africa Partnership Station (APS) begins the first day of martial-arts instruction for the 2nd Infantry Battalion of the Ghanaian Army. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Brian A. Goyak, 080208-N-0577G-140 Released)

SEKONDI, Ghana (Feb. 13, 2008) Africa Partnership Station (APS) Sailors load Project Handclasp medical supplies onto a supply truck for donation to the Ghanaian Navy Western Command hospital. Teams from various U.S. and European military commands, as well as governmental and non-governmental organizations, are embarked aboard the amphibious dock landing ship USS Fort McHenry and the high-speed vessel (HSV) 2 Swift for a seven-month deployment to enhance cooperative partnerships with regional maritime services in West and Central Africa and the Gulf of Guinea. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Brian A. Goyak, 080213-N-0577G-010 Released)

TAKORADI, Ghana, (Nov. 28, 2007) Lt. j.g. Erica Goodwin visits the children going to school next door to Essikado Hospital in Takoradi, Ghana. Members of Africa Partnership Station (APS) visited the school while working at the hospital to assess the possibility of working on the school during a future community relations project. The APS volunteers spent three days at the hospital building shelves, benches, laying concrete, painting and fixing the ambulance. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Elizabeth Merriam, 071128-N-0193M-401 Released)

APOWA, Ghana (Feb. 8, 2008) Utilitiesman 2nd Class Jeffery Ladd and Utilitiesman 2nd Class Paul J. Kuntz help a child drill a hole in part of a wall for a classroom at the Orphans Cry International Orphanage. Seabees and other volunteers worked on several projects at the orphanage in one of many Africa Partnership Station humanitarian projects in the region. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Eddie Harrison, 080208-N-4044H-113 Released)

SEKONDII, Ghana (Feb. 12, 2008) Damage Controlman 1st Class Adam Burg explains to Ghananian sailors the proper way to walk with the nozzle of a hose during a damage control exercise provided by Africa Partnership Station aboard a Ghananian Navy vessel. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Eddie Harrison, 080212-N-4044H-086 Released)

You can find these pictures and more at the
Photo Gallery - African Partnership Station

For the present, the headquarters of AFRICOM will remain in Stuttgart Germany. It is a triumph that African countries have held the line, and successfully opposed an AFRICOM headquarters on the continent. However, AFRICOM is just as dangerous without an actual headquarters in Africa. With Bush visiting Ghana this week, it is worth looking at exactly what Bush, AFRICOM, and US intentions are in Ghana and West Africa.

Oil is the main source of US interest. The US already gets more oil from Africa than from Saudi Arabia, and wants even more. The quality and quantity of African oil, and the ease of working on offshore deep water rigs, away from the population, make African oil particularly desirable.

Ghanaians should make no mistake. There is already a US military presence in Ghana. It occupies what the US military sometimes calls "lily pads" or "cooperative security locations". You probably know where some of these are. And this presence will grow. It is already growing through interactions with the African Partnership Station, the APS, the USS Fort McHenry that has been visiting Ghana and sailing along the Gulf of Guinea in 2007 and 2008.

The way it works:

"A cooperative security location can be a tucked-away corner of a host country's civilian airport, or a dirt runway somewhere with fuel and mechanical help nearby, or a military airport in a friendly country with which we have no formal basing agreement but, rather, an informal arrangement with private contractors acting as go-betweens ... The United States provides aid to upgrade maintenance facilities, thereby helping the host country to better project its own air and naval power in the region. At the same time, we hold periodic exercises with the host country's military, in which the base is a focus. We also offer humanitarian help to the surrounding area. Such civil-affairs projects garner positive publicity for our military in the local media... The result is a positive diplomatic context for getting the host country's approval for use of the base when and if we need it."

We have already been seeing this in action with the activities of the APS, the USS Fort McHenry. The reason USAID and diplomatic functions are subsumed under the Pentagon with AFRICOM is that:

Economic aid, development projects, or other forms of indirect compensation . . . may also be given with military considerations in mind. For example . . . constructing dozens of roads, piers, wharfs, bridges, and other infrastructure projects in the very areas where US troops have been deployed. . . . many of these infrastructure projects support US military mobility; at the same time, they have also proven very useful in gaining local public acceptance for US military presence. For the Special Forces, especially, the infrastructure and humanitarian projects are seen as instrumental in "winning hearts and minds" in the aim of getting what they call "actionable" intelligence.

We have seen cooperative military activities in Ghana, and we can see them in Djibouti, where -

CJTF-HOA (Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa) is positioned to serve as a model for AFRICOM

In Djibouti there is a great deal of humanitarian assistance, joint training, and other friendly and cooperative efforts going on. There is also a Special Forces team. From Djibouti the US assisted the Ethiopian government to invade Somalia in January 2007, and overthrow the only functioning government that Somalia had in 15 years, replacing it with the hated warlords, and creating a humanitarian crisis that dwarfs Darfur. Supposedly the US was fighting "terrorism". However, whoever is out of favor with the US is likely to be labeled a terrorist. This is not something new, historically:

The collapse of the Portuguese colonial forces in Mozambique, Angola, Guinea and Sao Tome and the collapse of the white racist military forces in Rhodesia gradually led to a rethinking by the US military. During this period the US had labeled all African freedom fighters as terrorists. When the US was allied with Osama Bin Laden and Jonas Savimbi, Nelson Mandela had been branded a terrorist.

In fact -

there are scholars who have argued and presented evidence that the government of the United States has been “fabricating terrorism” in Africa.

The Bush administration plans to employ mercenaries to do much of the business of AFRICOM, follow the link for more details. The "private contractors" mentioned above mean mercenaries. And the "partnerships" AFRICOM is promoting are intended to coopt African militaries so that they will do the dirty work in any fighting the US wants conducted in Africa.

That said, the US military provides the best military training you can find anywhere in the world. It is worthwhile to take the opportunity to learn from it. Most of the US soldiers and sailors are good people with excellent intentions. This does not necessarily apply to the contractors. At the same time it is important to keep in mind, that when you train with them, they will be learning a lot of information about you, your country, and your military organization. The intentions of Bush and his cronies, who give the orders, are not benign, and they intend to use the military to impose their goals by force where they see the "need", and impose a 21st century version of colonization. You can read here for the documentary trail of their plans and intentions.

. . . the Bush Family and their allies and cronies represent the confluence of three long-established power factions in the American elite: oil, arms and investments. These groups equate their own interests, their own wealth and privilege, with the interests of the nation - indeed, the world - as a whole. And they pursue these interests with every weapon at their command, including war, torture, deceit and corruption. Democracy means nothing to them - not even in their own country.

And this is the danger in dealing with them. They are a powerful force for corruption and exploitation, even as they preach democracy and "free" markets.

Below is a list of US military programs in Africa that will come under AFRICOM, and countries where they are active. You may have already encountered some of these in action. I know ACOTA has already been active in Ghana. For more detail about these see Africom: The new US military command for Africa.

• • Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative/Partnership (formerly Pan Sahel Initiative) (TSCTI) Targeting threats to US oil/natural gas operations in the Sahara region Algeria, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Senegal, Tunisia, Nigeria, and Libya.
  • TSTCI Africa Contingency Operations Training and Asssistance Program (ACOTA) (formerly African Crisis Response Initiative) (ACRI)) Part of “Global Peace” Operations Initiative (GPOI). Areas of Operation: Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia.
• • International Military Training and Education (IMET) program brings African military officers to US military academies and schools for indoctrination.
    Top countries: Botswana, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa.
  • Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) (formerly Africa Center for Security Studies) Part of National Defense University, Washington.
    Provides indoctrination for “next generation” African military officers. This is the “School of the Americas” for Africa. All of Africa is covered under the Foreign Military Sales Program which sells US military equipment to African nations via Defense Security Cooperation Agency.
    Top recipients: Botswana, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Zimbabwe.
  • African Coastal and Border Security Program Provides fast patrol boats, vehicles, electronic surveillance equipment, night vision equipment to littoral states.
  • Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) Military command based at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti. Aimed at putting down rebellions in Ethiopia, Somalia, and Somaliland and targets Eritrea. Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti.
  • Joint Task Force Aztec Silence (JTFAS) Targets terrorism in West and North Africa. Joint effort of EUCOM and Commander Sixth Fleet (Mediterranean) Based in Sigonella, Sicily and Tamanrasset air base in southern Algeria Gulf of Guinea Initiative.
  • US Navy Maritime Partnership Program Trains African militaries in port and off-shore oil platform security Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville, Congo-Kinshasa, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Nigeria, Sao Tome & Principe, Togo.
  • Tripartite Plus Intelligence Fusion Cell Based in Kisangani, DRC to oversee “regional security,” I.E. ensuring U.S. and Israeli access to Congo’s gold, diamonds, uranium, platinum, and col-tan. Congo-Kinshasa, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda.
  • United States Base access for Cooperative Security Locations (CSLs) and Forward Operating Locations (FOLs) U.S. access to airbases and other facilities Gabon, Kenya, Mali, Morocco, Tunisia, Namibia, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Uganda, Zambia, Algeria.
• Africa Regional Peacekeeping (ARP) Liaison with African “peacekeeping” military commands East Africa Regional Integration Team: Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Uganda, Kenya, Madagascar, Tanzania.
• North Africa Regional Integration Team: Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya.
• Central Africa Regional Integration Team: Congo (Kinshasa), Congo (Brazzaville), Chad.
• South Africa Regional Integration Team: South Africa, Zimbabwe, Angola.
• West Africa Regional Integration Team: Nigeria, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Niger, Western Sahara.
• Africa Partnership Station (APS) Port visits by USS Fort McHenry and High Speed Vessel (HSV) Swift. Part of US Navy’s Global Fleet Station Initiative. Training and liaison with local military personnel to ensure oil production security Senegal, Liberia, Ghana, Cameroon, Gabon, Sao Tome & Principe.

(To all the readers of this post, I copied this list from here. The guy who posted is strikes me as a nutter, and names himself after a cartoon character, but his factual information appears to be good. It is available publicly in part or in full in a number of places. This covers some of it.)

AFRICOM - lessons from the Philippines

TAKORADI, Ghana, (Nov. 28, 2007) Lt. j.g. Erica Goodwin visits the children going to school next door to Essikado Hospital in Takoradi, Ghana. Members of Africa Partnership Station (APS) visited the school while working at the hospital to assess the possibility of working on the school during a future community relations project. The APS volunteers spent three days at the hospital building shelves, benches, laying concrete, painting and fixing the ambulance. APS is scheduled to bring international training teams to Senegal, Liberia, Ghana, Cameroon, Gabon, and Sao Tome and Principe, and will support more than 20 humanitarian assistance projects in addition to hosting information exchanges and training with partner nations during its seven-month deployment. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Elizabeth Merriam, 071128-N-0193M-401 Released) A cheerful picture, regardless of doubts about the APS.

We can learn a lot about AFRICOM by observing US military activity in the Philippines, particularly if we understand the thinking behind it. Much of the military planning of the Bush administration has been done by participants in PNAC, Project for the New American Century. PNAC has been around since the early 90s and includes Cheney, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, and just about all the other neocon "thinkers" who wanted to invade Iraq since the early 90s, caused the invasion in 2003, and got it so wrong. They are the same ones who have been threatening Iran on the basis of information they know to be false. They used 9/11 to implement plans they had been discussing for years, taking advantage of the attack to push an increasingly aggressive militarism on the US and the world.

The self-avowed aim of the US is to perpetuate its position of being the world’s sole superpower in order to re-order the world. Its strategy to perpetuate its status is to prevent the rise of any rivals. To do this, it is seeking the capacity to deter and defeat potential enemies anywhere in the world by retaining and realigning its “global posture” or its ability to operate across the globe through its worldwide network of forward-deployed troops, bases, and access agreements. Today, the US believes that, of all its potential rivals, China poses the greatest threat and must therefore be contained before it becomes even more powerful. [1]

As well as calling for "regime change" in Iraq, some PNAC neocons have called for "regime change" in China and describe: "the defining military conflicts of the twenty-first century: if not a big war with China, then a series of Cold War-style standoffs that stretch out over years and decades."

Although at present: "China lacks the military capacity to compete with the United States; neither does it appear to be seeking to."[1] I am sure the neocons imagine many of their "Cold War-style standoffs" taking place in Africa, over African resources, especially oil.

In the guise of fighting terrorism, but in fact to "contain" China, US is unofficially reclaiming the Philippines as a military base of operations. The Philippines is generally friendly to the US, and strategically placed near China. The methods used in the Philippines look a lot like what the USS Fort McHenry is doing as the African Partnership Station along the Gulf of Guinea, or like what is happening in Djibouti.

Two articles detail how the US is reclaiming the Philippines as a military base, and also reveal a great deal about what all the AFRICOM talk about partnerships, aid, and development mean. The first of these:
At the door of all the east: the Philippines in United States Military Strategy by Herbert Docena, ISBN 978-971-92886-8-8 [1]
is extensively and meticulously documented, and in more abbreviated form:
How the US got its Philippine bases back by Herbert Docena in Asia Times [2]

The US closed its bases in the Philippines in 1991-2, but since 2001, a constant and increasing stream of US military personnel has been rotating in and out. No individuals, or individual units are there for long, but new units are constantly arriving.

For those who have been reading about AFRICOM, this should sound familiar:

Recognizing constraints posed by political realities (a population hostile to American military bases), the US has since been seeking access in ways that would be able to overcome domestic opposition by taking gradual and tentative but incremental steps, publicly justifying them in ways that are more acceptable to the public - i.e. as part of the "war on terror", to help modernize . . . etc.
. . .
. . . few are the days or weeks when there would be no US troops somewhere in the country giving lectures to . . . troops, participating in large-scale maneuvers, joining command exercises, simulating war games, or taking part in other related activities. . . .

Largely presented as efforts to modernize the . . . armed forces, the objectives behind the exercises are manifold and overlapping. First, the exercises allow the US military to be more familiar with the capabilities, organization, doctrines, and other characteristics of military forces . . . which they may have to fight against or fight alongside with in the future. . . . "[G]iven that these . . . militaries may well be U.S. partners or adversaries in future contingencies, becoming familiar with their capabilities and operating style and learning to operate with them are important."
. . .
"Maintaining an active program of military-to-military contacts . . . (so that) when the need arises, US military forces can find adequate access to perform their missions both quickly and safely."
. . .
Implicit in the relationship - as has been the case in previous US-led wars - is that the US will retain over-all command of any coalition in war. Hence, the goal behind the efforts to build ties with, train, strengthen, and develop the capabilities of local militaries is actually to de facto subsume and subordinate them under the US military organization.

. . .
Access over time can develop into habitual use of certain facilities by deployed US forces with the eventual goal of being guaranteed use in a crisis, or permission to pre-position logistics stocks and other critical material in strategic forward locations."

As US troops come and go in rotation for frequent, regular exercises, their presence - when taken together - makes up a formidable forward-presence that brings them closer to areas of possible action without need for huge infrastructure to support them and without inciting a lot of public attention and opposition.

. . .

"A cooperative security location can be a tucked-away corner of a host country's civilian airport, or a dirt runway somewhere with fuel and mechanical help nearby, or a military airport in a friendly country with which we have no formal basing agreement but, rather, an informal arrangement with private contractors acting as go-betweens ... The United States provides aid to upgrade maintenance facilities, thereby helping the host country to better project its own air and naval power in the region. At the same time, we hold periodic exercises with the host country's military, in which the base is a focus. We also offer humanitarian help to the surrounding area. Such civil-affairs projects garner positive publicity for our military in the local media... The result is a positive diplomatic context for getting the host country's approval for use of the base when and if we need it."
[1]

This is what has been going on in the Philippines, and this is what the AFRICOM training, partnerships, aid and development are all about. It brings the words of Nigeria's General Victor Malu into sharper focus (though this was some years earlier):

To make matters worse, even when we have reluctantly accepted because of the pressure from our Commander-in-Chief, to allow the Americans to train us, the Americans insisted they must live in the barracks with the soldiers. I left Abuja and flew to Sokoto to go and meet the governor, to plead with him to give us an area outside the barracks we would prepare it for the Americans. The governor accepted to do that. But the Americans turned it down insisting that they must live in the barracks with soldiers. I asked General Danjuma who was my GOC as far back as 1970, I said sir, you are my GOC in 1970, would you have allowed any army of any other country to come and stay with your own troops in the barracks? Well, at a point I didn't know whether he understood me or not, but this was the type of argument that was going on.

The other thing that is happening in the Philippines is that US is making special forces a more permanent presence, although one of which both the US and the Philippine public are not really aware.

Since 2002, a unit now called the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P) has been deployed to . . . the southern Philippines. (T)his unit has continuously maintained its presence in the country for the past six years.

. . .
US troops belonging to the unit have characterized their mission as "unconventional warfare", "foreign internal defense" and "counter-insurgency".
. . .
As Colonel Jim Linder, former head of JSOTF-P, has stated, "We're very much in a war out here ... We'll spill American blood on Jolo. It's only by luck, skill and the grace of God we haven't yet."
. . .
In terms of profile and mission, the JSOTF-P is similar to the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-Horn of Africa), which was established in Djibouti in eastern Africa in 2003 and also composed mostly of Special Forces. Like the JSOTF-P, the CJTF-Horn of Africa has also been conducting "humanitarian" missions and aid projects. Similar to the Philippines, Djibouti has also seen a dramatic increase in the amount of military aid it receives from the US. As a sample of the US's new austere basing template, the CJTF-Horn of Africa has been described as the "model for future US military operations".
[2]

And the infrastructure and humanitarian projects all have military significance. All of this is relevant to AFRICOM:

But it is not just military assistance per se that has military dimensions. Economic aid, development projects, or other forms of indirect compensation . . . may also be given with military considerations in mind. For example, for the past few years USAID has been constructing dozens of roads, piers, wharfs, bridges, and other infrastructure projects in the very areas where US troops have been deployed. As of 2006, USAID had finished 558 small infrastructure projects and 20 larger ones in Mindanao. As previously mentioned, many of these infrastructure projects support US military mobility; at the same time, they have also proven very useful in gaining local public acceptance for US military presence. For the Special Forces, especially, the infrastructure and humanitarian projects are seen as instrumental in "winning hearts and minds" in the aim of getting what they call "actionable" intelligence. As Army Captain Steve Battle of the JSOTF-P admitted, "I have a military objective behind my projects." Former JSOTF-P commander Col. Jim Linder said, "To do my job right, I am embedded inside USAID."
[1]

It is important for us all to be aware of what is really going on. There is much more in both these articles worth considering, with implications for all of Africa.

Military training in Senegal - more pictures, and more from the ECOWAS CDS

DAKAR, Senegal (Nov. 8, 2007) - Electrician's Mate 1st Class James Lamberson congratulates Senegalese Sailors, aboard the Amphibious Dock Landing Ship USS Fort McHenry (LSD 43), after their completion of training from Expeditionary Training Command and Africa Partnership Station (APS). APS aims to bring international training teams to Senegal, Liberia, Ghana, Cameroon, Gabon, and Sao Tome and Principe, and will support more than 20 humanitarian assistance projects in addition to hosting information exchanges and training with partner nations during its seven-month deployment. U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class RJ Stratchko ( 071108-N-8933S-060 RELEASED)

DAKAR, Senegal (Nov. 7, 2007) - Senegalese sailors receive hands-on training from Electrician's Mate 1st Class James Lamberson while Lt. Cmdr Fru Fon Clement, a Cameroon naval officer embarked with the Africa Partnership Station (APS) international staff, translates during basic approach drills. APS aims to bring international training teams to Senegal, Liberia, Ghana, Cameroon, Gabon, and Sao Tome and Principe, and will support more than 20 humanitarian assistance projects in addition to hosting information exchanges and training with partner nations aboard amphibious dock landing ship USS Fort McHenry (LSD 43). U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class R.J. Stratchko (071107-N-8933S-125 RELEASED)

Both pictures are from the US Navy story on training the Senegalese Navy. From the story:

"In three days you learn a lot, but it isn't very much time. The next time I hope to train for one week, two weeks, or a month. It's good for my Army," said Senegalese Marine Staff Sergeant, Fode Camara.

The Senegalese Sailors and Marines learned about preventative maintenance, combat lifesaving, self defense and small boat maintenance and handling.

"I'm very happy to train with United States Navy. I am very happy to do it, and I want to do more," said Camara. "Everything we learn is new. Now, when I return to my Army, I want to teach a young boy these new techniques."

For more news from USS Fort McHenry, visit http://www.navy.mil/local/lsd43/.



Juliana Taiwo, who has done some excellent reporting on AFRICOM for ThisDay in Nigeria, reports that:

Chief of Defence Staff, General Andrew Azazi, has said despite Liberian government's clamour to host AFRICOM, ECOWAS Chiefs of Defence Staff (CDS) would have the final say.

The President and Vice President of Liberia both reiterated their support of AFRICOM.

Azazi said though Liberia is a sovereign country, AFRICOM was a bit more technical to be treated as politics.

"The President addressed it when she met with us and the Vice President said ECOWAS should support Liberia, but what we feel is that nobody at the political level in African Union or ECOWAS knows enough about AFRICOM to make categorical statements. We are advocating that is not an issue for Chiefs of Defence Staff solely, we are advocating that at the political level, there should be either bilateral or multilateral interactions to create awareness to convince African leaders that AFRICOM will be good for Africa. What it means is that Africa must be willing to accept AFRICOM before it is sited. So if Liberia already is thinking of hosting AFRICOM, maybe they have a better understanding than the rest of them, but like the President told us, there are two things, we (the ECOWAS CDS) are going to discuss AFRICOM if our advise is that it is not good for the continent it will be rejected and if it is good, it will be accepted. Otherwise, the general understanding is that AFRICOM is suppose to be good for capacity building, but what we are saying is that we should have a better understanding of all that is going to come about, let's create awareness, let's be a partnership that will help both sides," he said.

Defence sources in Nigeria had in September, disclosed that the Nigerian government was already making serious diplomatic inquiries into the US government's establishment of a military base for Africa in Stuttgart.

This sounds like the ECOWAS Chiefs of Defense Staff are trying to act together and in accord, and that they are not interested in letting one country break ranks. As I understand this, if West Africa were to host AFRICOM, there has to be more information forthcoming from the US, and agreement between West African governments that it works to their advantage. I wonder if this solidarity will hold. And I wonder how this advantage, or lack of it, will be measured. I wish the CDS success in this endeavor. I don't see how the US can provide information that will genuinely answer the CDS questions. The US has been telling Africans that AFRICOM is not all the things the US media tells the US public that it is.

Will Ghana support recolonization by US AFRICOM?

ECOWAS HQ

An article in the US Defense News quotes the Chief of Air Staff of the Ghana Air Force, Air Vice Marshal Julius Otchere Boateng:

But a military official from Ghana, an African nation that had serious doubts about AFRICOM, now says American officials have done enough to resolve his concerns.

“I have had the chance to hear [U.S. officials] explain what is the reasoning behind the command, and it’s all about partnership,” Ghana Air Vice Marshal Julius Boateng said.

The biggest problem, Boateng said, is that his countrymen have not been well enough informed by Washington and government officials in Ghana about the specifics of U.S. plans for AFRICOM.

I think Air Vice Marshal Boateng is quite correct that his countrymen have not been well enough informed about the specifics of AFRICOM. IF he is being quoted correctly, Air Vice Marshal Boateng is still not sufficiently well informed himself. He may have heard sweet words from US officials that soothed his fears, he has not looked at the history, or the larger picture. If he actually believes the talk of partnership, he is easily fooled.

When AFRICOM is covered by the US news media, which is rare, the explanation for it is always oil, terrorism, and China. When US officials speak about AFRICOM to African leaders they say it is not about any of these, it is about aid, stability, and partnerships.

There has been no public explanation for AFRICOM that makes sense. Calling it an aid organization is laughable. There are already aid organizations, including USAID, that work quite well if they are funded. Nobody needs AFRICOM for diplomacy. Diplomacy has long established institutions in place.

The Bush administration think the only persuasion they need is the right marketing approach. They don't seem to be aware that people can see the truth of what is going on if they are willing to look. The concept of truth may be a bit alien to the Bush administration. At the AEI forum on September 20, Bushco seemed to think their marketing of AFRICOM had been flawed, and that was the reason African nations are hostile to the command. It did not seem to occur to them that several decades of pouring arms into Africa, and not much else, makes people skeptical about your good intentions. During the Bush administration humanitarian aid has decreased, and the tide of arms has increased exponentially, especially to countries with oil.

While the U.S. ranks number one in global weapons exports, it falls dead last among industrialized nations in providing non-military foreign aid to the developing world.

More arms do not mean more stability.

At the same time the US has been pouring arms into Africa, US and European, and now Chinese, trade policies have undercut African farmers and businesses, dumping heavily subsidized agricultural and other products on Africa, while maintaining tariffs and trade policies that kill any possibility of African competition. The west piously preaches to Africa about "free" trade, and how Africa (but only Africa) must have "open markets".

In addition to US arms, Europe and China have also poured cheap arms into Africa. And US activities in Iraq do not win friends anywhere. Africa does not need the US bringing terrorism into African countries again.

Both the President and Vice President of Liberia have endorsed AFRICOM. But Liberia has always been a US client state, and this looks like a continuation of that relationship. You can look at recent decades of Liberian history to see how well that special relationship with the US has worked for Liberia.

And it also looks like the US is trying to entice Nigeria as a host by dangling membership in the UN Security Council.

The United States (US) Government has said Nigeria has the possibility of becoming a permanent member of the United Nations (UN) Security Council if it follows through electoral reforms, strengthens the institutions of democracy, ensures stability and contributes to international peace and security.

The Bush administration is certain to continue a combination of threats and enticements, divide and conquer, to get African countries to accept AFRICOM. Unless US foreign policy and military policy turn in a dramatically different direction than they have taken for the last half century, any country that hosts AFRICOM surrenders its own sovereignty, and threatens the sovereignty and stability of its neighbors. AFRICOM will become the new colonial master. Military bases ARE American colonies.


As Isdore Guvamombe writes:

Stories about the army being set up to step up humanitarian assistance to Africa are mere rhetoric meant to hoodwink African governments into accepting a force that will eventually destabilise the whole continent.

Events in Kenya and Somalia are cases in point.

Africom must not be touched with a 10-foot pole by all in Africa

. . . if allowed to establish their permanent military force in Africa, the continent will be left stinking with endless conflicts.

Whichever country will be tricked into accepting to host Africom will automatically lose its sovereignty and integrity and will be judged harshly by history.

AFRICOM - arming every country that smiles this way

Today's automatic weapons are designed to be small enough, light enough, and easy enough to handle, that they can be routinely used by children.

Yesterday the President of Botswana visited the US, and asked what all those of us following current events in Africa are asking:

President Festus Mogae has re-iterated the need for Africa to know the full details of the proposed US Africa Command (AFRICOM) before it commits itself.

So far the US has defined AFRICOM by what it isn't, rather than what it is. Of course everyone knows what it is about, oil, and terrorism (defined as opposition to US oil interests) and China. However, these are clearly colonial intentions. The US cannot openly admit them, even though these are routinely the reasons given for the creation of AFRICOM in the US press.

The American Enterprise Institute held a forum titled: AFRICOM: Implications for African Security and U.S.-African Relations, on September 20th. Theresa Whelan of the U.S. Department of Defense was there repeating her usual remarks about what AFRICOM is not. According to Henry Ekwuruke:

The United States' new African military command structure – Africom – will neither base nor deploy U.S. forces on the African continent, the deputy assistant secretary of defense for African affairs, Teresa Whelan said Thursday . . . "we will have no bases… and we will not be deploying U.S. forces on the African continent." However, Africom as a command structure "will have a presence… in the form of staff officers" throughout Africa, she added. Nevertheless, "no more than 20 percent of the entire command will actually be physically present on the African continent."

And in another account:

Speaking at a panel discussion at the American Enterprise Institute, Whelan also worked to allay fears and dispel rumors that AFRICOM represents an American militarization of Africa and a possible usurpation of power from African leaders. She said critics are wrong in their assertion that AFRICOM is an attempt to further expand the war on terror in Africa, secure oil reserves, or hedge against Chinese influence there. "That is patently untrue," she said.

In fact, the US cannot find a single African country willing to host AFRICOM. As upyernose points out:

there are 46 countries in africa, more than in any other continent in the world. and that number bumps up to 53 if you include the disputed western sahara and island nations like cape verde, são tomé and príncipe, madagascar, the comoros, the seychelles, and mauritius. together that's about 25% of the total number of nations on earth. and yet, even among some of the poorest countries of the world who would surely reap economic benefits from a large first world military base, we could find not a single taker.

53 countries and no takers is truly remarkable. Of course there are a number of small bases in a number of countries, plus Djibouti, but no African country is willing to host AFRICOM headquarters so far. So for now the headquarters remains in Germany. But as Defense News points out, they haven't stopped looking for an African host. The same article cites oil and terrorism as reasons for the command. And it quotes a Heritage Foundation fellow saying the headquarters must be based in Africa. The article also says the command will be divided into 5 regional teams:

One team will have responsibility for a northern strip from Mauritania to Libya; another will operate in a block of east African nations -— Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Uganda, Kenya, Madagascar and Tanzania; and a third will carry out activities in a large southern block that includes South Africa, Zimbabwe and Angola, according to the briefing documents. A fourth team would concentrate on a group of central African countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Chad and Congo; the fifth regional team would focus on a western block that would cover Nigeria, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Niger and Western Sahara, according to the briefing documents.

This does not stop the militarization of US foreign policy that AFRICOM represents, it continues it. And it does not stop the destructive arms policies of the US, which has been pouring arms into Africa throughout the Bush presidency, just as in the bad old days of the Cold War.

As Frida Berrigan points out in The New Military Frontier: Africa -

Even as these discussions continue, some African nations are receiving significant increases in military aid and weapons sales; most of these increases have gone to oil-rich nations and compliant states where the U.S. military seeks a strategic toehold. The Center for Defense Information recently completed "U.S. Arms Exports and Military Assistance in the "Global War on Terror;" an analysis of increases in military aid since September 11, 2001. The report compares the military aid and weapons sales in the five-year leading up to 2001 and the five years since.

For example (among the African countries receiving this military assistance): since September 11, Kenya, which the State Department describes as a "frontline state" in the war on terrorism, has received eight times more military aid than in the preceding five years.

Djibouti, which has opened its territory to U.S. forces, received forty times more military aid, and an eightfold increase in the value of weapons transfers.

Oil-rich Algeria, where the surveillance equipment is based, has received ten times more aid and a warm embrace from Washington.

Nigeria, the fifth largest supplier of oil to the United States, is slated to receive $1.35 million in Foreign Military Financing for 2008 despite persistent human rights abuses.

Mali is described as an "active partner in the war against terrorism" by the State Department and is a good example of a little military aid going a long way . . .

U.S. arms sales to Ethiopia, which has one of Africa's largest armies, have roughly doubled and military aid has increased two and a half times.

As the Center for Defense Information points out:

The data clearly shows that the United States is sending unprecedented levels of military assistance to countries that it simultaneously criticizes for lack of respect for human rights and, in some cases, for questionable democratic processes. As a foreign policy, this is confusing, short-sighted and potentially very dangerous. Once weapons are delivered to a country, it becomes increasingly difficult to control how they are used and difficult to prevent them from being illicitly diverted anywhere in the world. While these countries are currently considered important to U.S. efforts in the “war on terror” now, political and military instability makes their continued allegiance to the United States questionable. Arming such countries with U.S. weaponry has troubling pitfalls: U.S. origin weapons could be used against the United States, its allies, or its interests. Selling arms for short-term political gains undermines long-term U.S national security and strategic interests.

This is NOT development aid. Many of these arms will go into the contraband pipeline, and help fund more drugs, human traffiking, child soldiers, and terrorism. These arms will decrease security, increase human rights abuses, and in the long run will earn the US more enemies than friends.


2/2008 - You can read my article reviewing the documentary trail on the Origins of AFRICOM over at the African Loft.

Whose hegemony? Nigeria, South Africa, AFRICOM - dangers ahead

Nigeria, South Africa, and several North African countries have now spoken out strongly against hosting the Africa Command. The US is claiming that Africom is just an aid agency with guns. But given the US military policy of Full Spectrum Dominance, it seems unlikely that development aid is what the US has in mind. This is particularly true in light of the fact that:

Since the beginning of the war on terrorism in 2001, the United States' top 10 sources of oil imports have experienced a 350 percent increase in U.S. military aid and training.

Nigeria may be trying to reinforce the economic clout it has in West Africa, maintaining and expanding the hegemony it has enjoyed to date. Not all of the countries in West Africa will find this an appealing prospect.

Likewise, South Africa is probably trying to maintain and expand its hegemony in southern Africa. And not all countries in southern Africa will see this as benign.

And both countries would like to increase their clout throughout the continent. Nevertheless, both of these countries are IN Africa, which gives them some a bit more right to speak FOR Africa than countries on other continents.

The US will try to drive wedges between these countries and their neighbors, but the US, and its full spectrum dominance approach, is hardly benign either. The US interests are oil and terrorism. Regardless of what is said to African leaders or the African press, oil and terrorism is how Africom is reported in the US press. Like the "communists" of the cold war, who became anyone who stood between the US and what it wanted, "terrorists" are anyone who stands between the US and oil. The US version of the colony is the military base.

China has been ruthlessly exploiting resources throughout southeast Asia, and there is no reason to suppose it will suddenly become more selfless and benign as it operates in Africa.

There are a whole lot of rocks and hard places ahead.

Nigeria says no to AFRICOM

At last West Africa speaks up! Nigeria says NO to AFRICOM.

From This Day:

The Federal Government has begun moves to frustrate the plan by the United States to establish a military base in the Gulf of Guinea.
. . .

"Nigeria is not taking the issue lightly at all and the government is not going to allow the US establish any military base anywhere in the ECOWAS region. The interest of the US government in the Gulf of Guinea has reinforced the commitment of the government to intensify its efforts at providing the needed security in the sub-region," the source said.

It was learnt that the Federal Government was worried by the terror alert raised by the US authorities last week and saw it as a ploy to label Nigeria and countries in the sub region as unsafe in order to get the opportunity to create a military base in the region.

As a first step to checkmate that plan, the FG has vowed to frustrate the campaign by the US to establish a base in the gulf.

"The government of this country is not ready for any blackmail. What they cannot get through the back doors they want to get through blackmail. We are not going to succumb to that game," the source said.

I think this can only be good news. While Nigeria's governments have not demonstrated any great responsiveness to the needs of her people to date, or established any reputation for good governance; letting the US recolonize the Niger Delta and the Gulf of Guinea will cause a great deal more suffering. The present US government is not capable of running the US, and has destroyed Iraq. Until the US can demonstrate both competence and good intentions, all countries should be wary in their dealings with it.

Dr. Wafula Okumu testifies on AFRICOM

Gulf of Guinea from Google maps

Here is part of the testimony of Dr. Wafula Okumu before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health. Included here, Dr. Okumu spells out what Africans think of AFRICOM, why Africans are reluctant to embrace AFRICOM, and a number of misconceptions. He also makes suggestions on how to clear up some of the misconceptions. This is as clear, comprehensive, and succinct a statement as you can find. I have included what I think is the key part of it below. The whole document is not too long, much of it is here, and it is well worth reading. Anyone involved in activities connected with AFRICOM, or interested in AFRICOM, or US engagement with Africa, should read it.

Africa Command: Opportunity for Enhanced Engagement or the Militarization of U.S.-Africa Relations?

Dr Wafula Okumu

Head, African Security Analysis Programme, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, South Africa

(excerpted from)
Testimony given to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health
August 2, 2007

. . . . .

What Africans think of Africom

Despite its altruistic sounding objectives Africom is yet to be warmly and widely embraced in Africa; as the following comments indicate:

· “Africom would destabilise an already fragile continent and region, which will be forced to engage with U.S. interests on military terms.”—Michele Ruiters, Business Day (Johannesburg)

· “Ironically, Africom was announced as Chinese President Hu Jintao was touring eight African nations to negotiate deals that will enable China to secure oil flows from Africa.” Editorial, Daily Nation (Nairobi), 8 February 2007

· Africom is “aimed at influencing, threatening and warding off any competitors by using force.” –Editorial, The Post (Lusaka), 12 April 2007.

· African countries “should wake up after seeing the scars of others (Afghanistan and Iraq).” Reporter (Algiers).

· Mohamed Bedjaoui, the Algerian Minister of State and Foreign Affairs, has questioned why there was no proposal for an anti-terror cooperation with Algeria when the country was experiencing high levels of terrorist violence in the 1990s.

· “How can the U.S. divide the world up into its own military commands? Wasn’t that for the United Nations to do? What would happen if China also decided to create its Africa command? Would this not lead to conflict on the Continent?” Abdullahi Alzubedi, Libyan Ambassador to South Africa.

· “Increased U.S. military presence in Africa may simply serve to protect unpopular regimes that are friendly to its interests, as was the case during the Cold War, while Africa slips further into poverty.”—Nigerian Journalist Dulue Mbachu.

· “People on the street (in Africa) assume their governments have already had too many dealings with the U.S. in the war on terror at the expense of the rule of law. The regimes realise the whole idea is very unpopular.”—Rachid Tlemchani, University of Algiers Professor.

These and many other similar comments expressed during the visits of U.S. officials, and in newspaper editorials and meeting on African peace and development have led a State Department Official to conclude that: “We’ve got a big image problem down there. Public opinion is really against getting into bed with the U.S. They just don’t trust the U.S.”

Why Africans are reluctant to embrace Africom

The coldness with which Africans hold Africom was displayed in July when Gen Kip Ward, the newly appointed first commander of Africom, was denied a meeting with the South African minister of defence, Mosiuoa Lekota, during his visit to the country to drum up support for the planned command. There are a number of reasons why Africans are reluctant to embrace Africom.

First, any country hosting the command will be criticised for violating Africa’s common positions on African defence and security, which discourages the hosting of foreign troops on the African soil. In particular, it is thought, such troops could be used to undermine the Continent’s Non-Aggression Pact, solemn declaration on common African defence and security, and other positions on hosting foreign bases in Africa.

Second, Africans vividly remember that colonialism was preceded by philanthropic missionaries who came to fulfil God’s Will of rescuing Africans from the clutches of barbarism. To paraphrase Kenyatta’s allegory, “when the Whiteman came to Africa, he was holding a Bible in one hand and asked us to close our eyes and pray. When we opened our eyes after the prayer, his other hand was holding a gun and all our land was gone!” Africa’s colonial history was characterised by military occupations, exploitation of its natural resources and suppression of its people. After testing decades of independence, these countries are now jealously guarding their sovereignty and are highly suspicious of foreigners, even those with good intentions.

Third, when Africans reflect on the continent’s relations with the U.S., they see ambiguity, neglect, and selective engagement. For instance, during the period of decolonization, the U.S. did not openly support the UN decolonization initiatives, particularly when these were not aligned with its Cold War positions. Often, the U.S. was reluctant to support anti-colonial and anti-apartheid liberation movements in Southern Africa and colonial Portugal, a member of NATO. U.S. forcefully reacted to African regimes that forged close relations with the Soviet Union and China, while aligning closer to anti-Communist African despots who were anti-democratic and had horrendous human rights records. With this historical background, Africom might be considered in Africa if its objectives did not appear to be based on the principle of “manifest destiny” of “saving Africa.” The proposal will be seriously considered if it primarily seeks to strengthen the capacity of the African Union and other African organizations to implement Africa’s development, peace and security agendas.

Fourth, Africans are not comfortable dealing with the military in matters related to their development and sovereignty. Africans are concerned that the establishment of Africom might do more harm than good—“the poised hammer that makes everything suddenly look like a nail,” in the words of Esquire magazine. They would be much more comfortable dealing with American diplomats, USAID and Peace Corp volunteers rather than the U.S. Marine. Africans are nervously concerned that Africom will sanction the militarization of diplomacy and severely undermine multilateralism on the continent. Africans have consciously adopted multilateralism as a common approach to addressing the continent’s problems and confronting its challenges. Africom seems to be a unilateral approach that would be counter to the current trend towards unity on the continent. Consequently, the establishment of Africom must secure an African consensus otherwise it would bring new and grave threats and challenges to the continent’s peace and security agenda. The issue of foreign military presence on the African soil is in violation of this agenda.

Additionally, the U.S. should bear in mind that following the emergence of other players in Africa; any initiative aimed at the whole continent cannot be unilaterally conceived and implemented. Although it is factually acknowledged that the U.S., as the most powerful global military and economic power, has the will and capacity to undertake unilateral actions, there are severe limitations and far-reaching consequences for the unconsidered use of power. The U.S. engagement in the Middle East has proved that the policy of consolidating democracy in the region, destroying al-Queda and removing abhorrent regimes from power can fail despite all its seemingly good intentions.

Fifth, the launching and the aggressive promotion of Africom are taking place at the same time that Africa is debating the “Union Government” proposal. There are feelings, as expressed in a recently held consultative meeting of the African Union PCRD in Lusaka, Zambia, that Africom is an American attempt to ensure that the aspiration for African Unity is checked by a heavy U.S. military presence on the continent. This concern is based on the track record of American military intervention in Africa. The image of U.S. military involvement in Africa becomes more confusing when one looks at the “hard” security concerns of Africa. Many Africans are asking why American troops were not deployed to prevent or restrain the Rwandan genocidaires. Why the U.S. forces remained anchored safely off the coast of Liberia when that country, the nearest thing America ever had to an African colony, faced brutal disintegration in 2003? Why the U.S. has not supported the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and instead supported the Ethiopian intervention through airpower from CJTF-HOA stationed in Djibouti? Is the U.S. really interested in addressing the felt security needs of Africans, or does its proposed military presence foreshadow the kind of destruction we have seen recently in Somalia? Is Africa to become merely another theatre of operations in which winning the “hearts and minds” forms an essential component of a “security” driven agenda? Why should ordinary Africans welcome an American presence that will create African targets for extremists where none existed, and add an unwelcome dimension to already complex local conflicts? Why is Washington not able to do something to address Africa’s needs by modifying its trade policy? If the U.S. is really committed to participating in the continent’s development why not support the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD)? This would surely have a greater developmental impact, if improving the livelihoods of the people is what the U.S. wants; maybe this has not been clearly stated as such in the previous definition of Africa’s needs.

Sixth, Africans were never consulted during the conceptualization of Africom. Rather Africom was announced and has been presented as a fait accompli. Africans are presently experiencing the exuberance of self-importance and confidence to drive their own destiny. There is a prevailing mood on the continent to reassert African self-worth and self-determination. This is why “consultation” has become a common cliché on the continent.

Seventh, there is also a concern that Africom will suffer from mission creep by being transformed from engagement in humanitarian missions to an interventionist force, as was the case with Operation Restore Hope in Somalia in 1992. The change of the humanitarian objectives could also come about due to the nexus of energy, poverty, and terrorism. Despite the oil wealth of African countries, 23 West African nations are ranked bottom on the UN human development index on poverty. The test case for this mission would be the Niger Delta region where an insurgency has been taking place since 2004, when unemployed youths took up arms to demand an equitable distribution of Nigeria’s oil wealth. Besides using violence, sabotage and kidnapping tactics, these youths under the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), have shut off approximately 711,000 barrels per day (bpd) of Nigeria’s output of 2.5 million bpd. There is a strong feeling that if such activities interfere with U.S. oil supplies in Africa, there is a high likelihood that Africom could be used to protect U.S. interests.

Eighth, militarization of U.S.-Africa relations—Africans are wary of the U.S. record in Iraq and concerned that the Pentagon is taking the lead role in the promotion of U.S. interests. Establishment of Africom could be seen as President Bush’s approach of using military force to pursue U.S. strategic interests. Africom will not only militarise U.S.-African relations but also those African countries in which it will be located. This could have far-reaching consequences, as the presence of American bases in these countries will create radical militants opposed to the U.S. and make Americans targets of violence.

Ninth, the mixed messages being relayed to Africa by the U.S. government have compounded the confusion and heightened the suspicions Africans have of Africom’s objectives:

· In 1995, the DOD in its U.S. Security Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa stated that the U.S. had “very little traditional strategic interest in Africa.” But Theresa Whelan, the Assistant Secretary for Defence, has recently argued that Africa is providing “tens of thousands of U.S. jobs, …possesses 8% of the world’s petroleum; and it is a major source of critical minerals, precious metals and food commodities.”

· Ryan Henry, the Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defence for Policy and Pentagon pointman on Africom, has stated that its purpose is not to wage war but “to work in concert with (U.S.) African partners for a more stable environment in which political and economic growth can take place.” However, Gen Wald minced no words when he stated that: “I’d like to have some forward bases in Africa. The world has changed and we are going to make our security. The Halcyon days are over.”

· General Bantz Craddock, the EUCOM Commander, told journalists in Washington in June that protecting energy assets, particularly in West Africa and the Gulf of Guinea, would guide the focus of Africom. Gen Craddock added that Africom will “enable countries (in West Africa) to improve their security of any type of production—oil, natural gas, minerals.”

· These intentions are reflective of the bold recommendations made by Vice President Dick Cheney’s National Energy Policy Development Group, in 2001, that the Bush administration “make(s) energy security a priority of (U.S.) trade and foreign policy.” One year later, the Bush administration rolled out its “West Point Doctrine” that essentially stated that the U.S. would not allow a major economic, political or military competitor to emerge.

. . . . .

Misconceptions of Americans

In view of the above, it is apparent that Americans have a number of misconceptions that need to be addressed before prescribing ways of how to address African concerns about Africom.

1. Muslims in Africa are attracted to radical ideology promoting violence against Western interests. This is not true, as Muslims are desperate to have education for their children so that they can compete in the globalized world. They want the basics of life like other people and there are many of them who would prefer to live in the U.S. rather than Saudi Arabia if given a choice.

2. Terrorism is a threat to African interests. Terrorism is not generally regarded in Africa as a major threat to the livelihoods of the people. Addressing it is not a top priority in security matters—compared to urban violence, pastoralist conflicts, proliferation arms and state violence. Africa is being terrorised by hunger, diseases (HIV/AIDS, malaria, etc), lack of life basics, oppressive laws, bad leadership, poor governance, unfair terms of international trade, foreign debt, conditionalities of international financial institutions, etc. Africans are afraid that Africom, in the guise of development assistance and combating terrorism, could be used to destabilise African countries, whose leaders and governments the U.S. does not get along with.

3. Africa is incapable of addressing its problems. Africans have been trying since 2000 to come up with strategies to address its underdevelopment, violent conflicts, and many threats to human security. These efforts have seen the formation of the New Partnership for Africa Development (NEPAD) and the African Union (AU). The AU has adopted an ambitious conflict prevention, management and resolution agenda that it is implementing through structures such as the Peace and Security Council. Other relevant structures include an African Standby Force (ASF) that would be based on 5 regional brigades. This is where the U.S. should play a critical role in building the capacities of these structures to promote peace and security in Africa.

4. Africom “will enhance (American) efforts to bring peace and security to the people of Africa and promote (American and African) common goals of development, health, education, democracy and economic growth in Africa,” according to President Bush. Some Africans think Africom would instead bring to them “military development, military health, military education, military democracy and military economic growth.” U.S. bases have produced a dependency culture in places such as the Philippines that increased poverty and disadvantaged women. U.S. military bases have brought unstable and uneven development to areas in which they were established. In countries with high unemployment and where most of the unemployed are women, sex work flourished, as it became a common means for women to feed their families.

What can be done to address African misconceptions of Africom

The U.S. needs to pay a keen attention to the following in order to overcome the serious concerns that Africans have of Africom.

· Open dialogue with civil society on the rationale, mission objectives and specific benefits that Africom would bring to the African human security agenda.

· Demonstrate opportunities within the proposed structure that would guarantee links with civil society to ensure participation and contextual relevance. Additionally, reconceptualize Africom to complement the African Standby Force and the work of the AU and Regional Mechanisms to prevent, manage and resolves conflicts in Africa.

· Share the exit strategy and phase-out plans and the milestones of Africom activities and encourage civil society to monitor them during the implementation phase, with specific focus on their outcomes.

· Define, elaborate and clarify Africom’s relationships with the AU (Peace and Security Council, AU Commission) and Regional Mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution.

· Guarantee that the interests and sovereignty of African states will not be compromised or undermined by Africom.

· Seek AU endorsement of Africom by the Executive Council and the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government.

· Since Africom is viewed within the wider context of the Global War on Terror and the likelihood of the theatre of terrorism shifting from the Middle East to Africa, it may be wise to review the timing. It could be even much better to wait until a time when the U.S. has an administration that is not regarded as arrogant and uncaring about other countries’ interests.

· Fully implement existing commitments, particularly the U.S. foreign assistance and public diplomacy programs in Africa: AGOA, the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), the President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI), USAID programs/projects, etc.

· Last but not least, the U.S. should seriously think of changing its international engagement and posture, which is increasingly espousing American exceptionalism and unilateralism. Whatever the virtues of the assault on Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, it, and its consequences, have impacted very negatively on U.S. prestige. Most African governments have expressed their deeply felt opposition to the enterprise. Those that have not are often seen to be seeking U.S. complicity in their own violations of human freedoms or hoping for some form of reward for their silence. The refusal of the U.S. to countenance the involvement of its armed forces in UN operations unless under U.S. command is also irksome, as are insistences on exemptions for U.S. citizens from prosecution in the ICC, and other objectionable elements of Status of Forces Agreements. This exceptionalism is also exhibited in the way US embassies are built to appear like barracks barricading American diplomats and making embassies no-go zones.

Conclusion

Africom will not be accepted in Africa if it does not take into account the desires and aspirations of the African people for peace, security and development. The policy that Africom aims to enhance should be reflective of the African realities: growing multipartism and democratic consolidation, the continuing quest for sustainable development, the need to enhance state capacity, the craving for good governance, promotion of human security, etc. Any foreign assistance to Africa must incorporate these realities, as well as the desires and aspirations of the African people. Africom will have a win/win outcome if it is reflective of these facts and is presented as a mutually beneficial partnership.

The hostility that it has faced so far points to the fact that Africom could turn out to be an expensive endeavor, both in terms of resources and long-term U.S.-Africa relations. It should not come as a surprise that Washington’s designs for Africa are now viewed with skepticism. Oil, China and terrorism are being seen to be the principal concerns of the U.S. initiative. If the coordination of a securitized development policy for Africa is part of the U.S. strategy, then it is seen by many local observers as essentially secondary and subordinate to the main aim.

Thank you for the honor and opportunity to share with you my views on this important issue. I would be more than glad to answer any question that the Subcommittee may have.