Human security in Africa

UN peace building

The Human Security Report Project has just released the Human Security Brief 2007 PDF. It contained two most compelling pieces of information:

Fatalities from terrorism have declined by some 40 percent, while the loose-knit terror network associated with Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda has suffered a dramatic collapse in popular support throughout the Muslim world.

This is directly contradictory to the fear mongering of the Bush administration. Every day it seems to be adding new states to the list that either harbor or sponsor al Qaeda. This is particularly true in African countries where the US has an interest in oil, natural resources, or in blocking Chinese access. We constantly hear about al Qaeda threats in a variety of African countries.

The Brief also describes and analyses the extraordinary, but largely unnoticed, positive change in sub-Saharan Africa's security landscape. After a surge of conflicts in the 1990s, the number of conflicts being waged in the region more than halved between 1999 and 2006; the combat toll dropped by 98 percent.

The Brief (PDF) contains the following regarding Africa:

° There has been a major decline in the scope and intensity of conflicts.
° Refugee numbers have shrunk substantially.
° The share of global humanitarian assistance going to Africa doubled between 1999 and 2006—from 23 percent to 46 percent
. . .
Between 2002 and 2006 the number of campaigns of organized violence against civilians fell by two-thirds.
…
Why the Sharp Increase in Conflict Numbers in the 1990s?

The increase in new state-based conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s was not unique to the region and was clearly related to the end of the Cold War. Regimes and rebel groups that had long been propped up by the assistance given by one or the other of the two superpowers suddenly found that this support—political as well as economic—had disappeared. The result in many cases, not just in sub-Saharan Africa, was regime change and ongoing political instability.

However, in sub-Saharan Africa something else was happening: The countries of the region, to a greater degree than in other parts of the world, were undergoing profound and wrenching political change. In 1988 nearly 90 percent of sub-Saharan African states had autocratic governments. By 2006 there were just two autocracies in the region, while the number of democracies had increased sixfold, from three to 18.

Had the only change been a decrease in autocracies and an increase in democracies, it would likely have enhanced regional security, since democracies tend to experience fewer armed conflicts than do autocracies. But these were not the only changes.

… [There were] trends in "anocracies"—a third regime type, one that is neither fully democratic nor fully autocratic, but a mix of both systems.

The increase in the number of anocracies in sub-Saharan Africa between 1988 and 2000 is startling—far greater than in any other region of the world. In 1988 there were two anocracies and 37 autocracies in sub-Saharan Africa. By 2000 there were just four autocracies, but 30 anocracies. This change is an important part of the explanation for the sharp increase in conflict numbers in the 1990s.

…
So what then does explain the sharp increase in the number of conflicts that have been brought to an end since the early 1990s? A major part of the answer lies with the extraordinary upsurge in international activism in the region directed towards stopping ongoing wars and seeking to prevent them from starting again. From the early 1990s, the international community— including the African Union (AU)—was bringing real pressure to bear on warring parties to negotiate an end to hostilities rather than to fight on to the bitter end. The big increase in negotiated settlements during this period suggests that this strategy has been effective. with the UN, to help stop wars and prevent them from starting again.

Postconflict peacebuilding missions also expanded rapidly and have played a positive role in helping prevent negotiated peace settlements from breaking down. From 1950 to 1999 there were just 18 negotiated settlements—and nearly half broke down within five years. From 2000 to 2005 there were 10 such settlements—thus far not one has broken down. Postconflict peacebuilding’s critical security role lies in helping to make negotiated settlements more stable.

It looks like negotiated settlements, followed up by some peacebuilding activity works, particularly those efforts of the UN and the AU.

Before visiting Africa Bush proposed major cuts in the US contribution to UN peacekeeping.

ABC News: U.S. Slashes Africa Peacekeeping Funds

The Bush administration will request no more funding for United Nations peacekeeping efforts, leaving in place proposed cuts expected to be as deep as 25 percent, according to officials and budget documents. Among the programs facing sharpest cuts are efforts to quell violence in Africa.

When ABC News first reported the proposed cuts in February, the administration contended that it might seek additional funding later in the year. But officials confirmed last week that they requested no additional funding in their supplemental budget recently submitted to Congress.

"Unless you are expecting the emergence of peace worldwide," the cuts are hard to understand …
[Before Bush's trip to Africa] White House officials talked up the trip and Bush's commitment to the continent, telling reporters how the president "really cares about Africa."

… U.S. funding for U.S. peacekeeping operations this year could reach $2.1 billion, but the administration had requested less than $1.5 billion to cover its share of the costs of U.N. peacekeeping efforts for 2009.

But "US peacekeeping" in Africa is not necessarily the same as peacekeeping. Under George Bush, "US peacekeeping" is more about controlling oil and other resources for US needs. In fact, Bush's intentions have been described as trying to undermine and circumvent both the UN and the AU, and replace them with AFRICOM, using the US military, mercenary corporations, and African surrogates to protect US corporate interests, the latest colonial occupation.

Mercenaries, PMCs - oversight and accountability

Mercenaries in New Orleans - "nation building" at home

David Isenberg at Dogs of War writes:

When it comes to issues of accountability, oversight and transparency in the private military and security industry . . . there is actually a fair degree of consensus that, yes, there should actually be such a thing: not just in words, but deeds as well.

The companies themselves, industry trade associations, and even various governments, are working together to try and hammer out standards that would apply to the industry globally.
. . .
But there is one government that should be in the lead on this issue, considering it is both the largest user of such firms and the country where the majority of them are based. Guess who it is. That's right, the United States.
. . .
The dollar value of Army contracts quadrupled from $23.3 billion in 1992 to $100.6 billion in 2006, according to a recent report by a Pentagon panel. But the number of Army contract supervisors was cut from 10,000 in 1990 to 5,500 currently.

And one can bet that the contract supervisors who are left vividly remember the case of Bunnatine H. "Bunny" Greenhouse. (story here) She was the senior contracting officer for the Army Corps of Engineers who objected -- first, internally, and then publicly -- to a multibillion-dollar, no-bid contract with Halliburton for work in Iraq. She was then removed from the senior executive service, the top rank of civilian government employees, allegedly because of poor performance reviews.
. . .
Not having provided the oversight that any half-wit would know is necessary when dealing with tens of billions of dollars in contracts is bad enough.

But turning a blind eye to possible criminal behavior is far worse. And yet that is what the Bush administration is doing.
. . .
Finally, as recently reported in the National Journal there was this head-scratching revelation. When President Bush signed the 2008 National Defense Authorization in January his approval support came with a catch: a signing statement in which he wrote that various provisions of the act, including language that would create a commission to examine "waste, fraud, and abuse" in wartime contracting in Iraq and elsewhere, "impose requirements that could inhibit" his "ability to carry out his constitutional obligations to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, to protect national security, to supervise the executive branch, and execute his authority as Commander in Chief."

Only in Bush-World can protecting the American taxpayer against graft and fraud be seen as endangering national security.

I doubt the IPOA is as interested in accountability as it claims. I suspect it may be more analagous to the steps the baseball players union took to prevent drug abuse, minimal, insincere, and ineffective. Although PMC, mercenary, accountability is becoming an issue around the world.

The definition of mercenaries is key. As of now, the definition excludes most of the people employed as PMCs. Step one needs to be an inclusive definition.

Bush slashed UN peacekeeping money for Africa just before visit

Bush slashed UN peacekeeping money for Africa just before visit is up at the African Loft.

Bush cuts UN peacekeeping money for Africa, still plans to increase the use of mercenaries

UN/AU soldiers in Darfur

Just before Bush left to play at being benevolent uncle in Africa, his administration cut funding for UN peacekeeping in African countries.

From ABC news:

On the eve of President Bush's trip to Africa, his administration has decided to drastically cut money for United Nations peacekeeping missions in war-torn countries there.
. . .
In war-torn Liberia, which President Bush will visit on his trip, the White House has proposed spending $56 million less on the U.N. peacekeeping mission there than it did last year. Bush . . . visit(ed) Rwanda, which is still struggling to right itself after a devastating, years-long civil war took the lives of millions. His administration's budget proposes cutting $5 million (from the UN tribunal in Rwanda.) . . .

The administration's 2009 budget also cuts millions for U.N. peacekeeping efforts in Sudan; Democratic Republic of Congo, where a decade-long war still claims thousands of lives a month; Chad, where rebels attempted a violent overthrow of the government Feb. 2; and Cote d'Ivoire, whose stability the Bush administration says "is a critical element in restoring peace to the entire West African region."

Obviously peace is way too important to pay to restore it.

Why did Bush cut funding for UN peacekeeping? The Bush administration is still planning on spending rivers of money on "nation building", "stability operations", and "peacekeeping", just not with the UN. The Department of State just issued AFRICAP Program Recompete, looking for contractors to:

. . . undertake a wide range of diverse projects, including setting up operational bases to support peacekeeping operations in hostile environments, military training and to providing a range of technical assistance and equipment for African militaries and peace support operations.

And the mercenaries are salivating at the Bush administration plans to hire more and more mercenaries, private military and security contractors, to accomplish Bush aims in Africa.

In October (2007), leaders in the private military security industry -- ArmorGroup, DynCorp, MPRI, and several others -- gathered at the Phoenix Park Hotel near the Capitol for the annual three-day summit of their trade group, the International Peace Operations Association. Panel speakers and members of the audience debated the future of nation-building efforts in failed states.
. . .
. . . handing out his business card that day, Army Lt. Col. James Boozell, a branch chief of the Stability Operations/Irregular Warfare Division at the Pentagon, said that the U.S. military was in fact experiencing a "watershed" moment in its 200-plus-year history -- nation building was now a core military mission to be led by the Army.

Boozell adds, however, that the Army can't possibly raise up failed states without . . . of course, private security contractors . . . -- boom times for nation building are here to stay.

They may need a lot more states to "fail" in order to keep the PMCs busy with new contracts.

Vijay Prashad and Mahmood Mamdani tell us how the US and the EU previously cut funding for African Union peacekeeping efforts in Sudan and Darfur. The AU was actually having some success in reducing violence. Bush does not want that success. By cutting UN peacekeeping funds now, Bush is trying to prevent an indigenous African force, or an international agency, from succeeding in peacekeeping.
In Darfur:

For a time the African Union was able to stabilize the situation, although it did not succeed in crafting a political solution to the problem. The African Union, created in 1999, has neither the financial ability to pay its troops nor the logistical capacity to do its job. The European Union, who paid the troop salaries, began to withhold funds on grounds of accountability, and it gradually killed off the peacekeeping operations. Columbia University Professor Mahmood Mamdani (who is one of the world's leading experts on contemporary Africa) says of this, "There is a concerted attempt being made to shift the political control of any intervention force inside Darfur from inside Africa to outside Africa." In other words, the U.S. and Europe are eager to control the dynamic of what happens in Africa and not allow an indigenous, inter-state agency to gain either the experience this would provide or the respect it would gain if it succeeds. The African Union has been undermined so that only the U.S. can appear as the savior of the beleaguered people of Darfur, and elsewhere.

Undermining the UN, and paying mercenaries instead of the UN, does not save money. This is not frugality. Private military contractors, PMCs, are in business to make money, and they are still very much on the Bush agenda.
cost + profit = increased cost

Of course the costs for PMCs can be reduced by using conscripts and child soldiers. And PMC profits can be increased by dealing in contraband. There are plenty of precedents.

I see these possible reasons why the Bush administration has cut UN peacekeeping funding.

• Prevent African or international solutions to African problems.
• Maintain the US as the only ones capable of solving violent unrest in African countries by preventing indigenous or alternative solutions.
• Provide more jobs and contracts for corporate cronies, the private military contractors.
• Prevent oversight, avoid US law and international law that might apply to US activities in African countries.
• Continue an intentionally destructive policy of undermining the UN.
• Incompetence (does not preclude any of the above.)

Bush in Africa, AFRICOM HQ to stay in Germany

Photo from a demonstration against Bush in Tanzania. I always get a laugh or a smile when I look at this sign.

See pictures of Bush in Ghana here.

Lots of stories coming out in the last few days about how AFRICOM headquarters will stay in Germany. In many ways this is a huge win for Africa. In other ways this is just point one for Africa in a preliminary skirmish. I think the Bush people have been watching too much western media coverage of Africa and did not realize how canny and tough their target is. And they certainly did not confer with anyone in Africa before creating AFRICOM.

The US press was all about how much Africans love Bush. The African press has not been quite so flattering. And I'm not hearing it from anyone I talk to in Ghana. A lot of Africa has been pro American in the past. Bush and his policies have really turned that around. There is good writeup A Critique of Bush's Africa Agenda over at the African Loft.

Samuel Okudzeto Ablakwa writes:
It is Bush who desperately needs us:

Contrary to the propaganda from the Whitehouse, their embassy in Accra and their surrogates in the Osu Castle that President Bush is here as the benevolent father who cares about us and is here to show concern about malaria, HIV/Aids and his Millennium Challenge Account – all these are but a smoke screen.
. . .
As Bush comes for our oil, he has the added PR advantage with the huge CNN and Fox networks behind him of being portrayed as the Bush who has a human side and cares about victims of malaria and HIV/Aids as he attempts a last minute face saving. The gullible ones may believe this PR stunt but not the majority of people around the world who have now read through the lines of America’s selfish foreign policy and will take to the streets in wild jubilation the day President Bush hands over not only as president of America but also as the tormentor-in-chief of our world.
. . .
Under the circumstance, it is he who needs us badly. Help will only come from within when we take the right decisions, break off from our present neo-colonial mentality and demand of our leaders not to sell us to the highest bidder.

In Ghana Bush arrived about 7pm Tuesday. Heads of state are generally greeted in Ghana by playing the guest national anthem and the Ghana national anthem. There was a band, an honor guard, a 21 gun salute planned, and the drama troupe and a dance troupe to greet him. Bush skipped them all and rushed off to where he was staying, and mostly kept away from people throughout his visit. One person remarked that an executioner is always afraid to sleep with his head up. In comparison, as everyone said, when Clinton visited, everyone could greet and touch him.

AFRICOM, US military bases, and Ghana

Pictures from the USS Fort McHenry, the African Partnership Station,
you will find discussion of AFRICOM, bases, and US military programs in Ghana and Africa below the photos.

TEMA, Ghana (Nov. 20, 2007) Rear Adm. Tony Kurta, director for Policy, Resources and Strategy, United States Naval Forces Europe, and Ghanaian navy Commodore Matthew Quashie, Eastern Ghana Naval Command, meet with Africa Partnership Station (APS) staff at the Tema Naval Base. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class RJ Stratchko, 071120-N-8933S-015 Released)

TAKORADI, Ghana (Feb. 8, 2008) Staff Sgt. Franklin Davis, of East Brunswick, N.J., a Marine assigned to Africa Partnership Station (APS) begins the first day of martial-arts instruction for the 2nd Infantry Battalion of the Ghanaian Army. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Brian A. Goyak, 080208-N-0577G-140 Released)

SEKONDI, Ghana (Feb. 13, 2008) Africa Partnership Station (APS) Sailors load Project Handclasp medical supplies onto a supply truck for donation to the Ghanaian Navy Western Command hospital. Teams from various U.S. and European military commands, as well as governmental and non-governmental organizations, are embarked aboard the amphibious dock landing ship USS Fort McHenry and the high-speed vessel (HSV) 2 Swift for a seven-month deployment to enhance cooperative partnerships with regional maritime services in West and Central Africa and the Gulf of Guinea. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Brian A. Goyak, 080213-N-0577G-010 Released)

TAKORADI, Ghana, (Nov. 28, 2007) Lt. j.g. Erica Goodwin visits the children going to school next door to Essikado Hospital in Takoradi, Ghana. Members of Africa Partnership Station (APS) visited the school while working at the hospital to assess the possibility of working on the school during a future community relations project. The APS volunteers spent three days at the hospital building shelves, benches, laying concrete, painting and fixing the ambulance. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Elizabeth Merriam, 071128-N-0193M-401 Released)

APOWA, Ghana (Feb. 8, 2008) Utilitiesman 2nd Class Jeffery Ladd and Utilitiesman 2nd Class Paul J. Kuntz help a child drill a hole in part of a wall for a classroom at the Orphans Cry International Orphanage. Seabees and other volunteers worked on several projects at the orphanage in one of many Africa Partnership Station humanitarian projects in the region. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Eddie Harrison, 080208-N-4044H-113 Released)

SEKONDII, Ghana (Feb. 12, 2008) Damage Controlman 1st Class Adam Burg explains to Ghananian sailors the proper way to walk with the nozzle of a hose during a damage control exercise provided by Africa Partnership Station aboard a Ghananian Navy vessel. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Eddie Harrison, 080212-N-4044H-086 Released)

You can find these pictures and more at the
Photo Gallery - African Partnership Station

For the present, the headquarters of AFRICOM will remain in Stuttgart Germany. It is a triumph that African countries have held the line, and successfully opposed an AFRICOM headquarters on the continent. However, AFRICOM is just as dangerous without an actual headquarters in Africa. With Bush visiting Ghana this week, it is worth looking at exactly what Bush, AFRICOM, and US intentions are in Ghana and West Africa.

Oil is the main source of US interest. The US already gets more oil from Africa than from Saudi Arabia, and wants even more. The quality and quantity of African oil, and the ease of working on offshore deep water rigs, away from the population, make African oil particularly desirable.

Ghanaians should make no mistake. There is already a US military presence in Ghana. It occupies what the US military sometimes calls "lily pads" or "cooperative security locations". You probably know where some of these are. And this presence will grow. It is already growing through interactions with the African Partnership Station, the APS, the USS Fort McHenry that has been visiting Ghana and sailing along the Gulf of Guinea in 2007 and 2008.

The way it works:

"A cooperative security location can be a tucked-away corner of a host country's civilian airport, or a dirt runway somewhere with fuel and mechanical help nearby, or a military airport in a friendly country with which we have no formal basing agreement but, rather, an informal arrangement with private contractors acting as go-betweens ... The United States provides aid to upgrade maintenance facilities, thereby helping the host country to better project its own air and naval power in the region. At the same time, we hold periodic exercises with the host country's military, in which the base is a focus. We also offer humanitarian help to the surrounding area. Such civil-affairs projects garner positive publicity for our military in the local media... The result is a positive diplomatic context for getting the host country's approval for use of the base when and if we need it."

We have already been seeing this in action with the activities of the APS, the USS Fort McHenry. The reason USAID and diplomatic functions are subsumed under the Pentagon with AFRICOM is that:

Economic aid, development projects, or other forms of indirect compensation . . . may also be given with military considerations in mind. For example . . . constructing dozens of roads, piers, wharfs, bridges, and other infrastructure projects in the very areas where US troops have been deployed. . . . many of these infrastructure projects support US military mobility; at the same time, they have also proven very useful in gaining local public acceptance for US military presence. For the Special Forces, especially, the infrastructure and humanitarian projects are seen as instrumental in "winning hearts and minds" in the aim of getting what they call "actionable" intelligence.

We have seen cooperative military activities in Ghana, and we can see them in Djibouti, where -

CJTF-HOA (Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa) is positioned to serve as a model for AFRICOM

In Djibouti there is a great deal of humanitarian assistance, joint training, and other friendly and cooperative efforts going on. There is also a Special Forces team. From Djibouti the US assisted the Ethiopian government to invade Somalia in January 2007, and overthrow the only functioning government that Somalia had in 15 years, replacing it with the hated warlords, and creating a humanitarian crisis that dwarfs Darfur. Supposedly the US was fighting "terrorism". However, whoever is out of favor with the US is likely to be labeled a terrorist. This is not something new, historically:

The collapse of the Portuguese colonial forces in Mozambique, Angola, Guinea and Sao Tome and the collapse of the white racist military forces in Rhodesia gradually led to a rethinking by the US military. During this period the US had labeled all African freedom fighters as terrorists. When the US was allied with Osama Bin Laden and Jonas Savimbi, Nelson Mandela had been branded a terrorist.

In fact -

there are scholars who have argued and presented evidence that the government of the United States has been “fabricating terrorism” in Africa.

The Bush administration plans to employ mercenaries to do much of the business of AFRICOM, follow the link for more details. The "private contractors" mentioned above mean mercenaries. And the "partnerships" AFRICOM is promoting are intended to coopt African militaries so that they will do the dirty work in any fighting the US wants conducted in Africa.

That said, the US military provides the best military training you can find anywhere in the world. It is worthwhile to take the opportunity to learn from it. Most of the US soldiers and sailors are good people with excellent intentions. This does not necessarily apply to the contractors. At the same time it is important to keep in mind, that when you train with them, they will be learning a lot of information about you, your country, and your military organization. The intentions of Bush and his cronies, who give the orders, are not benign, and they intend to use the military to impose their goals by force where they see the "need", and impose a 21st century version of colonization. You can read here for the documentary trail of their plans and intentions.

. . . the Bush Family and their allies and cronies represent the confluence of three long-established power factions in the American elite: oil, arms and investments. These groups equate their own interests, their own wealth and privilege, with the interests of the nation - indeed, the world - as a whole. And they pursue these interests with every weapon at their command, including war, torture, deceit and corruption. Democracy means nothing to them - not even in their own country.

And this is the danger in dealing with them. They are a powerful force for corruption and exploitation, even as they preach democracy and "free" markets.

Below is a list of US military programs in Africa that will come under AFRICOM, and countries where they are active. You may have already encountered some of these in action. I know ACOTA has already been active in Ghana. For more detail about these see Africom: The new US military command for Africa.

• • Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative/Partnership (formerly Pan Sahel Initiative) (TSCTI) Targeting threats to US oil/natural gas operations in the Sahara region Algeria, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Senegal, Tunisia, Nigeria, and Libya.
  • TSTCI Africa Contingency Operations Training and Asssistance Program (ACOTA) (formerly African Crisis Response Initiative) (ACRI)) Part of “Global Peace” Operations Initiative (GPOI). Areas of Operation: Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia.
• • International Military Training and Education (IMET) program brings African military officers to US military academies and schools for indoctrination.
    Top countries: Botswana, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa.
  • Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) (formerly Africa Center for Security Studies) Part of National Defense University, Washington.
    Provides indoctrination for “next generation” African military officers. This is the “School of the Americas” for Africa. All of Africa is covered under the Foreign Military Sales Program which sells US military equipment to African nations via Defense Security Cooperation Agency.
    Top recipients: Botswana, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Zimbabwe.
  • African Coastal and Border Security Program Provides fast patrol boats, vehicles, electronic surveillance equipment, night vision equipment to littoral states.
  • Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) Military command based at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti. Aimed at putting down rebellions in Ethiopia, Somalia, and Somaliland and targets Eritrea. Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti.
  • Joint Task Force Aztec Silence (JTFAS) Targets terrorism in West and North Africa. Joint effort of EUCOM and Commander Sixth Fleet (Mediterranean) Based in Sigonella, Sicily and Tamanrasset air base in southern Algeria Gulf of Guinea Initiative.
  • US Navy Maritime Partnership Program Trains African militaries in port and off-shore oil platform security Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville, Congo-Kinshasa, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Nigeria, Sao Tome & Principe, Togo.
  • Tripartite Plus Intelligence Fusion Cell Based in Kisangani, DRC to oversee “regional security,” I.E. ensuring U.S. and Israeli access to Congo’s gold, diamonds, uranium, platinum, and col-tan. Congo-Kinshasa, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda.
  • United States Base access for Cooperative Security Locations (CSLs) and Forward Operating Locations (FOLs) U.S. access to airbases and other facilities Gabon, Kenya, Mali, Morocco, Tunisia, Namibia, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Uganda, Zambia, Algeria.
• Africa Regional Peacekeeping (ARP) Liaison with African “peacekeeping” military commands East Africa Regional Integration Team: Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Uganda, Kenya, Madagascar, Tanzania.
• North Africa Regional Integration Team: Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya.
• Central Africa Regional Integration Team: Congo (Kinshasa), Congo (Brazzaville), Chad.
• South Africa Regional Integration Team: South Africa, Zimbabwe, Angola.
• West Africa Regional Integration Team: Nigeria, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Niger, Western Sahara.
• Africa Partnership Station (APS) Port visits by USS Fort McHenry and High Speed Vessel (HSV) Swift. Part of US Navy’s Global Fleet Station Initiative. Training and liaison with local military personnel to ensure oil production security Senegal, Liberia, Ghana, Cameroon, Gabon, Sao Tome & Principe.

(To all the readers of this post, I copied this list from here. The guy who posted is strikes me as a nutter, and names himself after a cartoon character, but his factual information appears to be good. It is available publicly in part or in full in a number of places. This covers some of it.)

Bush in Africa - 2

I posted Bush in Africa 2 over at the African Loft.

In true democratic fashion (Bush version) they have been preparing for Bush's visit to Rwanda by jailing people, assisted by the US Secret Service:

As Rwanda braces up for President Bush’s visit . . . the security agencies have detained hundreds of people in a security operations mounted across the country ahead of the visit, APA learns here Saturday.
. . .
The military source said the operation is being mounted by the national police force and military police with the help of the United States secret service.
. . .
The patrols are targeting congested areas like churches, trading centers and nightspots. "Life is simply not easy for ordinary people in Rwanda especially in Kigali"

And I cannot help feeling, much like Hamza Mustafa Njozi:
. . . for some of us, it is a huge embarrassment when the number one war criminal in the world, who should be facing charges in the Hague, showers praises on our leader.

Bush in Africa: Some Reactions; even the Tanzanians are Protesting

I posted a couple of quotations reacting to Bush's visit to Africa over at the African Loft. CareTaker added a video of protests in Tanzania that included the sign above.

FBI is deputizing vigilantes, giving them "shoot to kill" authority

The vigilante country club

A friend sent this earlier from the AlterNet: FBI Deputizes Private Contractors With Extraordinary Powers, Including 'Shoot to Kill'.

Today, more than 23,000 representatives of private industry are working quietly with the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security. The members of this rapidly growing group, called InfraGard, receive secret warnings of terrorist threats before the public does -- and, at least on one occasion, before elected officials. In return, they provide information to the government . . .
. . .
InfraGard is not readily accessible to the general public. Its communications with the FBI and Homeland Security are beyond the reach of the Freedom of Information Act under the "trade secrets" exemption, its website says. And any conversation with the public or the media is supposed to be carefully rehearsed.
. . .
One business owner in the United States tells me that InfraGard members are being advised on how to prepare for a martial law situation -- and what their role might be.
. . .

"The meeting started off innocuously enough, with the speakers talking about corporate espionage," he says. "From there, it just progressed. All of a sudden we were knee deep in what was expected of us when martial law is declared. We were expected to share all our resources, but in return we'd be given specific benefits." These included, he says, the ability to travel in restricted areas and to get people out. But that's not all.

"Then they said when -- not if -- martial law is declared, it was our responsibility to protect our portion of the infrastructure, and if we had to use deadly force to protect it, we couldn't be prosecuted," he says.

This sounds like the Bush administration is putting together a cadre of people who see themselves as privileged insiders, with a duty to spy on, and if necessary, kill, their fellow citizens. They don't have the training, discipline, structure, or mission of police or soldiers. A group like this can be easily manipulated if they think they are protecting their country. There is no oversight or protection in place to control the kind and quality of information they receive. And no accountability or protection regarding the information they provide. A bunch of people who think they are responsible for guarding the country, who are hopped up on patriotic fervor and fear, thinking they have the right to kill people who frighten them, is something no country needs.

This looks like a country club of vigilantes, using the country club model for membership. You have to be recommended by a member in order to "join", and are then vetted. This means that there will be an ideological similarity among the members. They are also more likely to look like each other, and less likely to look like a representative cross section of the US population. Open and inclusive are not words that describe this vigilante country club arm of government. How will they decide who looks dangerous?

The claim that Its communications with the FBI and Homeland Security are beyond the reach of the Freedom of Information Act under the "trade secrets" exemption should send a chill down the spine of anyone who loves the United States and values the US Constitution. This extra judicial, extra constitutional privatized spying and law enforcement takes the US another step down the road to the privatized model of government found in Congo Brazzaville.

African oil in the Financial Times

There were two stories about African oil in the Financial Times today.

The new scramble for Africa's resources:

The rise of Africa as an energy region is not a short-term trend
. . .
Yet the effect of increased corporate interest has not always translated to economic well-being for African countries. (an almost comic understatement)

Soaring oil prices have threatened to wipe out recent economic gains on what is both the world's poorest continent and its fastest-growing oil and gas exploration zone of the past decade. According to the International Energy Agency, the increase in the cost of oil in 13 non-producing countries, including stable economies such as South Africa, Senegal and Ghana has since 2004 been equivalent to 3 per cent of their combined gross domestic product. This is more than the debt relief and foreign aid received during the same period.
. . .

The contrast between the multi-billion dollar international oil industry and the grinding realities of Africa is nowhere more apparent than in Nigeria's Niger Delta, the most prolific zone in the Atlantic basin, from where the US expects to source up to a quarter of its oil imports in the next decade. There, armed militants using an anti-poverty rhetoric have cut a quarter of Nigeria's production in pre-dawn raids on oil facilities and kidnapped scores of oil workers in the past two years, a potent symbol of the kind of disorder that can occur on the doorstep of huge investments.

Much of the capacity being added on the continent may be too far offshore to be affected by the kind of militancy seen in the delta. But US policymakers nevertheless remain deeply concerned about stability in oil-producing zones. In response to this concern, President Bush last year ordered the creation of Africom, a dedicated US military command centre for Africa which is expected to be situated in a yet-to-be chosen country on the continent.

The US military has recently started focusing on West Africa, with a $500m plan to help Saharan states eradicate Islamist cells linked to al-Qaeda that could otherwise threaten stability in oil-producing countries in the region, particularly Nigeria. The co-operation has drawn criticism from human rights groups which say the US is repeating its Middle East mistakes by cosying up to despotic and corrupt regimes on the continent.

Indeed, Condoleezza Rice, the US secretary of state, typified US confusion on Africa policy when she described Teodoro Obiang Nguema, the president of oil-rich Equatorial Guinea where US supermajors Chevron and ExxonMobil have interests as a "good friend", despite widespread concern over human rights abuses and corruption.. . .

Where Africa's resources are becoming hot property, big energy producing countries are beginning to push for greater control of their own oil and gas industries, much to the chagrin of the traditional oil majors.

As you see above, the Financial Times flatly states that African oil is the reason Bush created AFRICOM, and the reason for the US military focus.

Energy producing countries should push for greater control of their resources and industries. Of course they also need to push for a more equitable distribution of the profits. How, and how much, will AFRICOM be used to push back and maintain US control?

The second article, Plenty of room for minnows discusses the proliferation and role of small oil companies in Africa.

With many of the oil majors in the past few years focused on the multibillion dollar deepwater investments in the Gulf of Guinea, and oil prices so high, the past few years have seen plenty of incentives for smaller companies to try to make it big in Africa.
. . .
If they develop their assets cleverly, or even discover significant oil finds, the rewards may be a lucrative takeover bid from a big company.
. . .
. . . "Essentially, the creation of a secondary market is just beginning to happen on the continent."

Companies that are interested in Africa range from small start-ups that have snapped up speculative oil licences, to the likes of Tullow Oil, which has booked a relatively large discovery in Ghana and which today has a market capitalisation of more than £3.7bn. Medium- sized companies from the Arab world have also started expressing an interest in holding African oil and gas assets.

Some of the more successful companies have built up their reputations by leveraging their insider contacts in government circles.

Indeed, Afren's founding board members include Rilwanu Lukman, the former president of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries and Nigerian presidential adviser, which probably goes some way towards explaining why Afren was able to secure a $200m non-recourse facility from BNP Paribas, the largest loan the bank has ever made to a company with no cashflow.
. . .
But the share price volatility of such companies remain high because their assets are often concentrated in a small number of countries. Indeed half of small oil companies trading on Aim are now below their issue price.
. . .
But the share price volatility of such companies remain high because their assets are often concentrated in a small number of countries. Indeed half of small oil companies trading on Aim are now below their issue price.
. . .
In the meantime, some companies, detecting wider investor scepticism, are busy looking to tie themselves more closely with African investors who may also have clout in government circles.

This is not the kind of situation that makes fighting corruption easy.

Criminal Politics from Human Rights Watch

Criminal Politics: Violence, “Godfathers” and Corruption in Nigeria

I ran across a blog that was new to me that has some interesting things to say:
ijebuman's diary: The online ramblings of an Ijebu man in London
I found what he has to say interesting, and his style entertaining.

His post Criminal Politics - a report by HRW took me to this October 2007 report: Human Rights Watch has released an extensive report on the political situation in Nigeria, called Criminal Politics: Violence, “Godfathers” and Corruption in Nigeria, click here for the Pdf version

I've been reading in the report, and it does not paint a promising picture. Most of the governors are utterly corrupt and unaccountable to anyone. The youth are being manipulated and betrayed by their leadership. Just one example of this betrayal is youth training and employment programs being used to pay young men to act as political thugs on behalf of politicians. Considering the fact that a number of US Department of Defense and Pentagon planners consider Nigeria well on the way to being a failed state, and these same planners want Nigeria's oil, prospects for the future are doubly discouraging. There has even been talk about redrawing African borders, and this from people who went into Iraq without knowing there is a difference between Sunni and Shia.

AFRICOM is already hanging around offshore, and partnering in the neighborhood. The HRW report makes a number of excellent recommendations, but it is hard to see how they might be implemented. There are a number of people in Nigeria who would like to turn the corruption around. But too many of the people who have the power and authority to do it, are enriched and advantaged by corruption. There may be some hope with the courts, which the report indicates are still for the most part trying to do their jobs. But courts alone can't do it because their activities are by nature largely reactive. The situation also needs proactive measures.


Another post lists suggestions for How to keep your job (Naija style), which, with some slight alterations, applies just as well to all the corrupt and criminal cronies around Bush. I've certainly seen US versions of all 10 of these ploys in the news. I've copied some below. Substitute "the United States" for "Nigeria", and there are only slight differences.

So you've been caught with your hands in the till (or in this case indicted for not following due process by awarding a contract to an unregistered company run by one of your aides).
No worries, here are a few tips on how to save your job;

1. The best form of defence is an attack, start by turning the tables on your opponents by accusing them of similar crimes.

2. Play the victim. Claim you've been set up and you know nothing about the allegations.

3. Employ a powerful Godfather to apply pressure on those in power
. . .
6. Employ Spiritual methods. Call on all pastors and imams to pray for you and Nigeria. If you attend a Pentecostal church, you can organise night vigils, prayer requests or make a large donation to your pastor to ensure he is on your case 24/7.
. . .
9. Set up a fictional group called "concerned citizens of Nigeria", get the "group" to put out a full page ad in the news papers claiming there is a conspiracy against you. They should also list your "accomplishments" and declare you're the best ***** Nigeria ever had.

10. Employ good old "shakara". Declare that "it's God's will" that you got to your current position and by "God's grace" no one can remove you

.

Has Yar'Adua been bought out by Bush and AFRICOM?

After meeting with Bush at the White House, Nigeria's President Yar'Adua appears to have reversed direction and announced Nigeria is ready to "partner" with AFRICOM. To understand what partnership means, see my earlier post on how it works in the Philippines, and how that relates to AFRICOM. Partnership may provide the US with everything it wants and needs, both access and resources. I don't know what combination of bribes and threats were directed at Yar'Adua, but combinations of bribes and threats are how Bush and his cronies do business. The story was reported by This Day, and in allAfrica.com: Nigeria: Yar'Adua in White House, Ready to Partner U.S. On Africom.

President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua yesterday at the White House in Washington, D.C., United States (US) stated that Nigeria would partner the US/AFRICA Command (AFRICOM) on security on the continent.

The Council of States of which the President is Chairman, recently voiced opposition to the command.

Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chief Ojo Maduekwe, who is part of the President's delegation to the US had himself stated that Nigeria would not support the presence of US troops on African soil under the auspices of AFRICOM.

But at a press briefing at the Oval Office, with President George W. Bush in attendance, Yar'Adua made known his new position.

"We have discussed on security issues, security within Nigeria, the Niger Delta, the Gulf of Guinea and peace and security on the African continent. We shall partner AFRICOM to assist not only Nigeria but also the African continent to actualise its peace and security initiatives. It is an initiative to have standby forces in each of the regional economic groupings in Africa," said the President.

The President did not give details of the discussion on AFRICOM, such as whether Nigeria will be used as the Command's base, an issue that has emerged contentious in recent times.

But his support at the White House was a clear departure from the leaning of his administration on the issue.

As CareTaker at African Loft writes:

This disclosure is opposite of what was disclosed by the Nigerian government in November, and clearly contrary to general expectation of AfricanLoft users (See AfricanLoft debate on AFRICOM) and the Nigerian public.

And as Omotaylor writes in the comments:

It will be a grevious mistake in the long term if Nigeria i.e. Yaradua deviates from his earlier decision and partners with the US on AFRICOM. It will be interesting to hear in the near future his full explanation and reasoning behind changing his mind. Leaders are accountable to the people for when the problem starts, the people are the same that would suffer for it.

Again, referring to my earlier post, Bush's AFRICOM may not need much of a geographic headquarters to accomplish what it wants, if it can get enough African "partners".

AFRICOM - lessons from the Philippines

TAKORADI, Ghana, (Nov. 28, 2007) Lt. j.g. Erica Goodwin visits the children going to school next door to Essikado Hospital in Takoradi, Ghana. Members of Africa Partnership Station (APS) visited the school while working at the hospital to assess the possibility of working on the school during a future community relations project. The APS volunteers spent three days at the hospital building shelves, benches, laying concrete, painting and fixing the ambulance. APS is scheduled to bring international training teams to Senegal, Liberia, Ghana, Cameroon, Gabon, and Sao Tome and Principe, and will support more than 20 humanitarian assistance projects in addition to hosting information exchanges and training with partner nations during its seven-month deployment. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Elizabeth Merriam, 071128-N-0193M-401 Released) A cheerful picture, regardless of doubts about the APS.

We can learn a lot about AFRICOM by observing US military activity in the Philippines, particularly if we understand the thinking behind it. Much of the military planning of the Bush administration has been done by participants in PNAC, Project for the New American Century. PNAC has been around since the early 90s and includes Cheney, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, and just about all the other neocon "thinkers" who wanted to invade Iraq since the early 90s, caused the invasion in 2003, and got it so wrong. They are the same ones who have been threatening Iran on the basis of information they know to be false. They used 9/11 to implement plans they had been discussing for years, taking advantage of the attack to push an increasingly aggressive militarism on the US and the world.

The self-avowed aim of the US is to perpetuate its position of being the world’s sole superpower in order to re-order the world. Its strategy to perpetuate its status is to prevent the rise of any rivals. To do this, it is seeking the capacity to deter and defeat potential enemies anywhere in the world by retaining and realigning its “global posture” or its ability to operate across the globe through its worldwide network of forward-deployed troops, bases, and access agreements. Today, the US believes that, of all its potential rivals, China poses the greatest threat and must therefore be contained before it becomes even more powerful. [1]

As well as calling for "regime change" in Iraq, some PNAC neocons have called for "regime change" in China and describe: "the defining military conflicts of the twenty-first century: if not a big war with China, then a series of Cold War-style standoffs that stretch out over years and decades."

Although at present: "China lacks the military capacity to compete with the United States; neither does it appear to be seeking to."[1] I am sure the neocons imagine many of their "Cold War-style standoffs" taking place in Africa, over African resources, especially oil.

In the guise of fighting terrorism, but in fact to "contain" China, US is unofficially reclaiming the Philippines as a military base of operations. The Philippines is generally friendly to the US, and strategically placed near China. The methods used in the Philippines look a lot like what the USS Fort McHenry is doing as the African Partnership Station along the Gulf of Guinea, or like what is happening in Djibouti.

Two articles detail how the US is reclaiming the Philippines as a military base, and also reveal a great deal about what all the AFRICOM talk about partnerships, aid, and development mean. The first of these:
At the door of all the east: the Philippines in United States Military Strategy by Herbert Docena, ISBN 978-971-92886-8-8 [1]
is extensively and meticulously documented, and in more abbreviated form:
How the US got its Philippine bases back by Herbert Docena in Asia Times [2]

The US closed its bases in the Philippines in 1991-2, but since 2001, a constant and increasing stream of US military personnel has been rotating in and out. No individuals, or individual units are there for long, but new units are constantly arriving.

For those who have been reading about AFRICOM, this should sound familiar:

Recognizing constraints posed by political realities (a population hostile to American military bases), the US has since been seeking access in ways that would be able to overcome domestic opposition by taking gradual and tentative but incremental steps, publicly justifying them in ways that are more acceptable to the public - i.e. as part of the "war on terror", to help modernize . . . etc.
. . .
. . . few are the days or weeks when there would be no US troops somewhere in the country giving lectures to . . . troops, participating in large-scale maneuvers, joining command exercises, simulating war games, or taking part in other related activities. . . .

Largely presented as efforts to modernize the . . . armed forces, the objectives behind the exercises are manifold and overlapping. First, the exercises allow the US military to be more familiar with the capabilities, organization, doctrines, and other characteristics of military forces . . . which they may have to fight against or fight alongside with in the future. . . . "[G]iven that these . . . militaries may well be U.S. partners or adversaries in future contingencies, becoming familiar with their capabilities and operating style and learning to operate with them are important."
. . .
"Maintaining an active program of military-to-military contacts . . . (so that) when the need arises, US military forces can find adequate access to perform their missions both quickly and safely."
. . .
Implicit in the relationship - as has been the case in previous US-led wars - is that the US will retain over-all command of any coalition in war. Hence, the goal behind the efforts to build ties with, train, strengthen, and develop the capabilities of local militaries is actually to de facto subsume and subordinate them under the US military organization.

. . .
Access over time can develop into habitual use of certain facilities by deployed US forces with the eventual goal of being guaranteed use in a crisis, or permission to pre-position logistics stocks and other critical material in strategic forward locations."

As US troops come and go in rotation for frequent, regular exercises, their presence - when taken together - makes up a formidable forward-presence that brings them closer to areas of possible action without need for huge infrastructure to support them and without inciting a lot of public attention and opposition.

. . .

"A cooperative security location can be a tucked-away corner of a host country's civilian airport, or a dirt runway somewhere with fuel and mechanical help nearby, or a military airport in a friendly country with which we have no formal basing agreement but, rather, an informal arrangement with private contractors acting as go-betweens ... The United States provides aid to upgrade maintenance facilities, thereby helping the host country to better project its own air and naval power in the region. At the same time, we hold periodic exercises with the host country's military, in which the base is a focus. We also offer humanitarian help to the surrounding area. Such civil-affairs projects garner positive publicity for our military in the local media... The result is a positive diplomatic context for getting the host country's approval for use of the base when and if we need it."
[1]

This is what has been going on in the Philippines, and this is what the AFRICOM training, partnerships, aid and development are all about. It brings the words of Nigeria's General Victor Malu into sharper focus (though this was some years earlier):

To make matters worse, even when we have reluctantly accepted because of the pressure from our Commander-in-Chief, to allow the Americans to train us, the Americans insisted they must live in the barracks with the soldiers. I left Abuja and flew to Sokoto to go and meet the governor, to plead with him to give us an area outside the barracks we would prepare it for the Americans. The governor accepted to do that. But the Americans turned it down insisting that they must live in the barracks with soldiers. I asked General Danjuma who was my GOC as far back as 1970, I said sir, you are my GOC in 1970, would you have allowed any army of any other country to come and stay with your own troops in the barracks? Well, at a point I didn't know whether he understood me or not, but this was the type of argument that was going on.

The other thing that is happening in the Philippines is that US is making special forces a more permanent presence, although one of which both the US and the Philippine public are not really aware.

Since 2002, a unit now called the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P) has been deployed to . . . the southern Philippines. (T)his unit has continuously maintained its presence in the country for the past six years.

. . .
US troops belonging to the unit have characterized their mission as "unconventional warfare", "foreign internal defense" and "counter-insurgency".
. . .
As Colonel Jim Linder, former head of JSOTF-P, has stated, "We're very much in a war out here ... We'll spill American blood on Jolo. It's only by luck, skill and the grace of God we haven't yet."
. . .
In terms of profile and mission, the JSOTF-P is similar to the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-Horn of Africa), which was established in Djibouti in eastern Africa in 2003 and also composed mostly of Special Forces. Like the JSOTF-P, the CJTF-Horn of Africa has also been conducting "humanitarian" missions and aid projects. Similar to the Philippines, Djibouti has also seen a dramatic increase in the amount of military aid it receives from the US. As a sample of the US's new austere basing template, the CJTF-Horn of Africa has been described as the "model for future US military operations".
[2]

And the infrastructure and humanitarian projects all have military significance. All of this is relevant to AFRICOM:

But it is not just military assistance per se that has military dimensions. Economic aid, development projects, or other forms of indirect compensation . . . may also be given with military considerations in mind. For example, for the past few years USAID has been constructing dozens of roads, piers, wharfs, bridges, and other infrastructure projects in the very areas where US troops have been deployed. As of 2006, USAID had finished 558 small infrastructure projects and 20 larger ones in Mindanao. As previously mentioned, many of these infrastructure projects support US military mobility; at the same time, they have also proven very useful in gaining local public acceptance for US military presence. For the Special Forces, especially, the infrastructure and humanitarian projects are seen as instrumental in "winning hearts and minds" in the aim of getting what they call "actionable" intelligence. As Army Captain Steve Battle of the JSOTF-P admitted, "I have a military objective behind my projects." Former JSOTF-P commander Col. Jim Linder said, "To do my job right, I am embedded inside USAID."
[1]

It is important for us all to be aware of what is really going on. There is much more in both these articles worth considering, with implications for all of Africa.

Mercenaries and AFRICOM

AFL, Armed Forces of Liberia, first graduation parade for troops trained by DynCorp. This article from Liberia's Anaylst newspaper is quite enthusiastic about the training.

DynCorp, an American security contractor, was recently awarded US$ 40 million in contracts from the US State Department to train and transform the former rebel group, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), into a professional military force. The disclosure of the company's latest operations in Sudan raises questions regarding the appropriate role of security contractors in conflict zones as well as the aims of the US government in mediating the situation in Sudan. (11/07)

One thing the creators of AFRICOM have not discussed publicly since its creation is the role of mercenaries, military contractors, in the military engagement with Africa. And no one should make any mistake, a military command is military engagement, no matter how much they talk about aid and diplomacy. This blog has discussed some of the potential uses and issues surrounding mercenaries and mercenary corporations, and how they might be used in Africa in the future, both by governments and corporations.

There is no doubt that the Bush administration intends extensive use of military contractors in Africa. They have said so. In November 2003 Theresa Whelan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs, and frequent spokesperson for AFRICOM, addressed a dinner of the Orwellianly named IPOA, International Peace Operations Association, the association of military contractors. (The contractors are also described more accurately as PMCs or PMFs, private military contractors or private military firms). Much of Whelan's speech (full text here) was about use of PMCs in Africa, and about how their role is on the rise. "Contractors are here to stay in supporting US national security objectives overseas."

In situations where government and social institutions have collapsed, as in civil wars, it is critical that there is accountability and oversight in the rebuilding process. PMCs simply do not have sufficient accountability and oversight built into their operations. In fact one of the reasons to employ them is precisely to avoid accountability and oversight. And Whelan points this out in her speech: "some times we may not want to be very visible." She is quoted in an article in The Guardian that ties her to an attempted coup in Equatorial Guinea. If that is the case, it is another situation where the US has supported both sides of a conflict.

And she seems to want to move the PMCs away from accountability, from her speech:

Also, the current International Criminal Court situation leaves the civilians out in the open with regard to potential criminal sanctions. Again, this is an area that needs to be explored more. The military are automatically covered by SOFAs, but the contractors are hanging out there. It gets back to my earlier comments that we have to try to work the contractors into the SOFAs in order to provide protection. (SOFA: Status of forces agreement - An agreement that defines the legal position of a visiting military force deployed in the territory of a friendly state. The Bush administration is known for bullying countries into signing SOFAs that exempt US soldiers from much accountability.)

Whelan says using the PMCs is cheaper than using the US military. However, corporations are in business to make a profit. Adding profit to the cost means a higher cost, cost+profit = bigger cost. Alternatively, or even additionally, PMCs, or their employees, can increase profits by trading in contraband and human traffiking, and have been repeatedly implicated in these activities in Africa, raising profits for the PMCs, employees and employers, and raising costs, often paid in blood, by the people in whose lands they operate.

PMCs at work in Africa:

The Analyst's article on training the Liberian army seems quite pleased with the training that DynCorp is providing. Although it does ask some questions about the process for how the officer candidates are chosen, which seems to be minus any transparency. The author expresses some confidence because "the Americans are also monitoring the process against any abuse." Given the record of abuse and corruption racked up by the Bush administration and its contractors in Iraq and in the US, I would not count on US oversight being very helpful at present.

Contractors have conducted training in Ghana, from Whelan's speech:

For example, today, Ghana’s ACOTA (African Contingencies Operations Training and Assistance Program) training program, both field and classroom, has been conducted entirely by civilian contractors. Now actually some of these contractors were reservists but nonetheless it was all contractor training, we did not have any active duty military participating in the training.

Regarding the picture from Sudan above, if the US government hopes to be seen as acting in good faith by the government of Sudan, it should not be using PMCs to arm and train rebel groups. That is a fairly explicit indication the US is working against the Sudanese government for another "regime change". It is unlikely to help the people in Darfur or southern Sudan, and it limits what the US is able to do in any diplomatic direction. And, it means more people will be hurt and die.

When the eastern Congo is mentioned at all in the US media, the terrible violence there, and in the Great Lakes region, is presented as some inexplicable African dysfunction. Both Europe and the United States have actively contributed to successive waves of weapons, warfare and invasion, brutalizing and terrorizing the local people, and leaving millions dead. Even here the problems go back to post World War II and the Cold War, including the role the US played in the origins of state sponsored terrorism in Africa.(link corrected) PMCs have been leading participants throughout all of this. Keith Harmon Snow and David Barouski provide a lot of background, and write in their carefully documented article:

Private Military Contractors (PMCs) are also big business in Africa. Brown & Root, a subsidiary of Halliburton, helped build a military base near Cyangugu, Rwanda just next to the Congo-Rwandan border. ”Officially,” Brown and Root was there to clear land mines, but instead housed mercenaries from Military Professional Resources Inc. (MPRI) who trained the RPF and Laurent Kabila’s ADFL for invasion of the Congo in 1996, and the Rwandan army’s re-invasion in 1998, after Laurent Kabila threw out the Rwandans, Ugandans, Bechtel and the IMF. The French intelligence service reported that U.S. Special Forces and mercenaries from MPRI participated in the murder of Rwandan Hutu refugees on the Oso River near Goma in 1996 and even claims to have turned over the bodies of two American soldiers killed in combat near Goma. The circumstances surrounding the unofficial recovery of these two U.S. soldiers remain very mysterious.

MPRI is based in Arlington, Virginia and is staffed and run by 36 retired U.S. generals. It is contracted by the Pentagon to fulfill the African Crisis Responsive Initiative (ACRI). This program includes the Ugandan military, and it supplied military training in guerrilla warfare to Ugandan officers at Fort Bragg, North Carolina in July 1996. During the invasion of the Congo in 1998, Ugandan soldiers were found with ACRI equipment while Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have implicated Ugandan battalions trained by ACRI in rapes, murders, extortion, and beatings of Ugandan civilians.

And another article by Jules-Cesar Malula, writing from Kinshasa, comments on the company Executive Outcomes' activities in the Great Lakes region:

Another mercenary firm, Executive Outcomes, has established other private military companies that operate around Africa. Cofounder Tony Buckingham’s Heritage Oil and Gas company works closely with PMC Sandline International to manipulate the petroleum options around Lake Albert.

It is believed to have signed concession deals with warring armies and governments on both sides of the Uganda-DRC border.

The expansion of conflicts, who profits and how, and who pays the cost and how, and the expansion of mercenary armies, is a looming danger of AFRICOM. It is something the African Union, the regional organizations, and citizens of African countries, need to watch.

2/2008 - You can read my article on mercenaries in Africa over at the African Loft: The Rising Mercenary Industry and AFRICOM.